

# Special Warfare

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THE CHALLENGE OF OPERATING IN THE  
**GRAY ZONE**



## On the Cover

### The Gray Zone:

The Place between Peace and War is becoming a critical point of discussion.

*Cover and left: U.S. Army photos.*

## ARTICLES

- 12** Harnessing Cyber-Technology's Human Potential
- 17** Potential Impact of Daesh Attacks Spreading to Lebanon and Bahrain
- 18** The Gray Zone
- 26** Special Operations Forces Captain's Career Course

## DEPARTMENTS

- 04** From the Commandant
- 05** Updates
- 28** Career Notes
- 30** Human Performance
- 32** Education Update
- 33** Book Review
- 34** Opinion



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SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL**

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# Special Warfare

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## FROM THE COMMANDANT



The Gray Zone — the space between war and peace — is becoming the topic of conversation among members of not only the U.S. Army Special Operations Regiments, but also sister services, the interagency and academia. It is in this in-between place, that ARSOF is the most productive and the most successful. It is here that we work best; setting conditions, prepping the battlespace and working within the Human Domain.


As noted in ADP 3-05 *Special Operations*, our activities in countries outside of designated theaters of war can “shape potential operational environments by working through host nation or friendly indigenous forces to assist with conflict avoidance or mitigation and set the condition for other forces.” This is also when our forces develop a “deep understanding of local conditions and cultures, which allows for nuanced and low-visibility shaping of the environment.”

This is what we train for and what we test in Robin Sage. Perfecting this art comes from years of study, from developing comfort with ambiguity, from an understanding of knowing how to operate in a complex arena of competition. Our success depends on our ability to not only map the human terrain, but also how to navigate it. In the Gray Zone, what you do is as important as what you don’t do.

In this issue, Capt. Phillip Kapusta discusses how the U.S. government can improve its ability to operate effectively in the gray zone between war and peace by reshaping its intellectual, organizational and institutional models.

Lt. Col. Patrick Duggan takes a close look at another aspect of the gray zone: utilizing cyber technology to influence the human terrain to affect conflict before it occurs.

There is a very real global threat that is tied to ungoverned places around our world; areas that are the definition of the gray zone. We must look at threats through a broad lens; understanding that there isn’t just one answer. In the same manner we must seek to find the connective tissue that spreads threats throughout a region and utilizing every weapon at our disposal— diplomatic, humanitarian and boots on the ground— to ensure that the web of unrest does not spread further.

  
Major General James B. Linder

## Linder Takes the Reigns at the Special Warfare Center

Maj. Gen. James B. Linder took command of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, May 4, during a ceremony at the JFK Plaza hosted by Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Linder, the former commander of Special Operations Command-Africa, headquartered at Kelley Barracks near Stuttgart, Germany, is replaced Maj. Gen. Eric Wendt, who assumed the duties of Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith near Honolulu, Hawaii.

"No Army Special Operations officer can match the accrued knowledge and expertise of Maj. Gen. Wendt," said Cleveland. "There is no doubt Eric will leave his mark on U.S. security before he leaves uniform."

Cleveland applauded Wendt's numerous initiatives and put into place within the Army during his short time at the USAJFKSWCS, and his ability to build relationships across the Army. "Eric has a unique ability to explain SOF, and that is a powerful skill," he said.

"I'd like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School for their tremendous innovations and world-class work over the last year, and for upholding the highest standards," said Wendt. "I praise the people and the institution of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and also thank the local communities and associations that have provided so much support to the Special Warfare Center and School in the last year."

Cleveland went on to note that he could not have found a better replacement for Wendt than Linder, noting that he brings a wealth of experience back to SWCS from his time at SOC Africa, as well as his ingenuity, expertise and sense of humor. Linder is not a stranger to the school house, having commanded the support battalion and served as Deputy Commanding Officer, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne).

The USAJFKSWCS, the Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, is comprised of three groups: the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), the Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne) and the Special Warfare Medical Group (Airborne). Additionally, it is home to the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy and the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center.

Linder is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Naval War College and holds master's degrees in International Relations and in National Security and Strategic Studies from Webster University and the U.S. Naval War College, respectively.



**INCOMING** Brig. Gen. James B. Linder accepts the Special Warfare Center colors from USASOC Commander, Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland during the change of command ceremony. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Robert Burley.

He served in a variety of troop and staff assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment (Airborne) and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He also served in multiple positions within Special Operations, followed by a staff assignment in the Joint Special Operations Command.

Upon completion of a Senior Service College Fellowship at the CIA, Linder commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, followed by an assignment at the Joint Staff.

After serving as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army Special Operations Command, Linder was the Deputy Commanding General-Special Operations Forces, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan; with a follow-on assignment as the Deputy J3 for United States Africa Command.

Linder has earned qualifications as a Master Parachutist, Military Free Fall Master Parachutist, Special Forces Combat Diver Supervisor, Ranger and Special Forces.

Having already experienced the complexity of the USAJFKSWCS, Linder is ready to get back to business. To that end, Linder related a story from his time at SOC Africa.

"Imagine a small group of soldiers on a presence patrol in their local community, a community that has grown in fondness for these soldiers because they have consistently demonstrated that their duty is to protect those who can't protect themselves," he said. "They have heard the stories of Boko Haram's brutality ... and only last week, they strapped a body bomb on an innocent

*continued on page 06*

## Leahy Takes Command of the 5th Special Forces Group

Soldiers, family members and friends gathered together on Gabriel Field, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, July 16, for the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) change of command ceremony.

Col. John W. Brennan took command of the 5th SFG(A) from August 2013. He passed the group's colors to Col. Kevin C. Leahy. The passing of the colors is an Army tradition symbolizing the passing of responsibility from one commander to another.

Brig. Gen. Darsie D. Rogers, the then-commanding general of 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (Provisional), hosted the ceremony and shared with the audience his personal observations about the two commanders and the Soldiers and families, past and present, of 5th Special Forces Group(A).

"It is my honor to be here today, thank you for joining us to bid farewell to Colonel Brennan and welcome Colonel Leahy as the 5th Special Forces Group commander," said Rogers.

"Under the command of Colonel Brennan, 5th Group set the standard in every measurable way possible," Rogers continued. "These Soldiers standing in front of you represent the best of our best. They are highly intelligent, extremely savvy and masters of the art of influence. These traits are directly contributed to the leadership, mentorship and coaching of Colonel John Brennan and his command team."

"We are proud of you, your command team, and the Legion for its magnificent performance," said Rogers.

After his powerful words on the accomplishments of Brennan, Rogers spoke about how he personally served with Leahy in and out of combat, and welcomed him home.

"Colonel Leahy, you bring a wealth of knowledge and experience. I have seen you in action and you are the right guy to lead this Group and we are glad to have you back," said Rogers.

*continued on page 08*

## USASOC Welcomes Tovo as Commanding General

Soldiers from the United States Army Special Operations Command said farewell to Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland and welcomed Lt. Gen. Kenneth E. Tovo during a change of command ceremony at Meadows Field, July 1.

Cleveland relinquished command of USASOC to Tovo after nearly three years as the commanding general of the prestigious unit.

Tovo is assuming commanding after completing his most recent assignment as the military deputy commander of U.S. Southern Command in Miami, Fla.

Gen. Joseph L. Votel, commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Command, officiated the ceremony and passed the unit colors from Cleveland to Tovo, representing the transfer of authority. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army Chief of Staff was a distinguished guest in attendance.

“The passing of the colors from one commander to another is largely symbolic but it is richly traditional and important, representing the passing of authority and the responsibility of the command. It is a visual representation of transitioning leadership and the continuity of this great organization,” said Votel.

While speaking to the audience, Votel also spoke words of praise of Cleveland’s success.

“[Cleveland] subsequently refocused Army Special Operations with ARSOF 2022, laying out the principles, the intellectual underpinnings and the resource strategy to enable the Army SOF to thrive in an environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty and a form of hybrid warfare that we have not previously experienced,” said Votel. “Though met at first with some resistance, [Cleveland] stayed the course, educating others on its purpose and importance until it was understood by the Army, USSOCOM, our geographic combatant commanders and our oversight committees; his persistence and vision has made unconventional warfare a part of our national security lexicon.”

Cleveland has had numerous accomplishments while in charge of USASOC. Of those, one of his most notable is ARSOF 2022 — the blueprint for ARSOF’s success in future operations.

“Nearly three years ago, USASOC embarked on the journey to fundamentally change the way our nation viewed its special operations forces. At the time, our redirect was divisive, our processes were unbalanced and our standing in the Army, though high, was fragile and uneven, built on personalities and shared respect born of combat, but quickly receding as the press war subsided,” said Cleve-

land, addressing Gen. Odierno and reflecting on his assumed responsibilities. “Your challenge to me, Sir, was to make sure that we don’t let that pass.”

“I couldn’t be prouder of what this magnificent team of professionals, and our friends throughout the Army, have accomplished in this short period. In our blueprint for change, ARSOF 2022 and part two, we outlined our planned to pay a hefty sequestration bill — one that ultimately led to the unpopular loss of 20-25 percent our or Special Forces and Ranger warfighting capacity, said Cleveland. “In the end we redesigned ourselves to be better at our respective special warfare and surgical strike missions, to begin learning how the two should work in concert with one another as well was with our conventional force.”

Cleveland has stated in the past that ARSOF 2022 describes precept and imperatives that will enable ARSOF to thrive in a future operating environment that is characterized by uncertainty. He also said ARSOF 2022 has clarified the narrative for ARSOF by providing direction to the force and establishing a process for future force development that leads to better support of joint force commanders. ARSOF 2022 set in motion a number of changes primarily focused on the tactical aspects of special operations and became the impetus behind the new focus on SOF operational art.

As the longest serving “Green Beret” on active duty, Cleveland, who will be retiring later this year, also took time to thank everyone who made an impact on him during his illustrious 37 year career.

“To the many friends across my career and this country, it has been my honor to serve with you. My career may have culminated here, but many of you are responsible for my continued success,” said Cleveland, speaking to the large audience of family, friends and distinguished guests.

“Freedom isn’t free, and we have the great fortune to have those who are willing to step forward and ready to pay the price, we as a nation should never take that for granted. Indeed our biggest security threats could be from within; not lone wolf terrorists or sleeper cells, but from a divisiveness that erodes our will, our belief in ourselves and what America stands for,” said Cleveland.

In his closing remarks Cleveland added, “We are the good guys. Everywhere we go we are the good guys. We stand for something, something good, the individual freedom, liberty and rights given to us by our creator that having traveled the world I can



**PASSING IT ON** Outgoing USASOC commander Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland (right) passes the colors to the incoming commander Lt. Gen. Kenneth E. Tovo during the change of command ceremony. U.S. Army photo by Spc. David M. Shefchuk.

honestly say exists nowhere else in the way it does here in this great land. It’s what makes us strong.”

Following Cleveland, Tovo said he was honored and humbled for the opportunity to become the twelfth commanding general in USASOC’s storied history and assured Gen. Odierno and Gen. Votel, that he will do everything he can to meet expectations for the USASOC Soldiers, the U.S. Army and, most importantly, for the nation as the senior leader of USASOC.

“In my mind USASOC must do four things well: we must sustain today’s fight; we must sustain today’s force; we must prepare for the future; and, most importantly, we must honor, preserve and build upon the tremendous legacy of our predecessors,” Tovo said.

“It requires that we embody quiet professionals, that we maintain the highest level of standards and discipline in everything that we do, and that, when call upon by this nation — and we will be called upon — that our deeds live up to this organization’s creed: *Sine Pari*, without equal.” — USASOC Public Affairs Office.

## Linder Takes the Reigns at the Special Warfare Center *continued from page 05*

10-year-old little girl — walked her into the public market and detonated her; killing nine and wounding others. The town is now nervous and alert.”

“Now imagine these soldiers walking their daily presence patrols through town when a woman no one recognizes ... attempts to fling herself on a bus loaded with people. The passengers block her, close the door and attempt to speed away,” he explained that the woman, unable to mount the bus, attempted to leap on the back of a soldier, but was stopped by another soldier who placed a well-aimed shot and prevented her from detonating another body bomb in the area.

The story is true. The outcome, Linder explains, was different because of the relationship between the African soldiers, who had been working side-by-side

U.S. Green Berets for the past five months, and because their Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations counterparts had shaped the local community.

“Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Special Warfare Center. This is where the U.S. Army’s Special Operations warriors are built,” said Linder. “Today we pause briefly to recognize the contributions of Maj. Gen. Eric Wendt and the extraordinary men and women of this magnificent command. At the conclusion of this ceremony, we return to the business of securing the idea of liberty. We return to the business of defeating violent extremist. We return to the business of building Army Special Operations Warriors.” — USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office.

## USASOC Welcomes its First Command Chief Warrant Officer

The United States Army Special Operations Command inducted its first command chief warrant officer, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Heriberto Serrano Jr., during a ceremony June 18 at Heritage Auditorium at the command headquarters.

“Everything has a time and a place,” said Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commanding general, USASOC. “I don’t necessarily think this is overdue, it’s the right thing to do now. In the business of talent management and the business of bringing together, our warrant officer capability now marries up nicely with what we’ve done with the rest of the changes in the command.”

Prior to being named the command’s first CCWO, Serrano served in a dual-hatted role as the Chief Warrant Officer of the Special Forces Branch and Command Chief Warrant Officer for the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

“It feels a little surreal to be up here to tell you the truth,” Serrano said. “I’m a little humbled by looking at all your faces and I’m extremely taken aback by all the things the warrant officers have done in this organization to get to where we are at today. I didn’t get here by myself. I got here because of all the warrant officers, past and present, and all the hard work they’re doing. That’s why this position was created.”

Although the Army Warrant Officer Corps traces its lineage all the way back to 1918, the position of CCWO was first instituted by the Army National Guard Bureau in 1996 when it developed the role of state command chief warrant officer.

The presence of warrant officers within USASOC ensures not only the technical and tactical competence expected of the cohort, but also a continuity of expertise managing warfighting systems and equipment that is unique to the Department of Defense.

Serrano, who has 32 years of service, was chosen after a stringent selection process based on his significant Army Special Operations experience, professional military education, leadership capabilities and other highly desirable traits. He was selected from a pool of 12 other highly qualified candidates from across the Army Special Operations Forces enterprise.

For his newly-inherited role, Serrano will serve as the senior warrant officer advisor for USASOC on all aspects of Army special operations. In addition, he will be the principal advisor to the commander, his staff and subordinate warrant officer leaders regarding the unique recruiting, accession, training, retention, professional development and personnel management of all warrant officers assigned to USASOC.



**IT'S A FIRST** Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland (left), commanding general, USASOC, presents USASOC’s first command chief warrant officer, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Heriberto Serrano Jr. with the Command Chief Warrant Officer Charge of Orders. U.S. Army photo by Spc. David M. Shefchuk.

Serrano will also be responsible for coordination with higher headquarters and external organizations to synchronize and enhance the management of warrant officers within the U.S. Army and appropriate branches, ensuring maximum support to the warfighting commands.

“I’m not up here to be a 180 Alpha,” he said. “I’m up here to be the command chief warrant officer for all of you. The bottom line is you get up in the morning to go to work for your commanders and your organization. I get up in the morning to work for you. That’s the privilege that I have. With that my vision is pretty clear for my position – support the warfighter so he can protect our nation, without fear, without fail and without equal. *Sine Pari.*” – by Sgt. 1st Class Thadius S. Dawkins II, USASOC Public Affairs.



## USASOC Change of Responsibility

More than 120 Soldiers, civilians, families and friends of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command attended the command sergeant major change of responsibility ceremony held at the John F. Kennedy auditorium, July 22, 2015.

Command Sgt. Maj. George A. Bequer relinquished his responsibility as the USASOC command sergeant major to Command Sgt. Maj. Robert V. Abernethy.

“Today is a bittersweet moment for the USASOC family. On one hand, we bid farewell to Command Sgt. Maj. Bequer who for the last 32 years has dedicated his life to improving the health, welfare and wellbeing of our Army Special Operations Forces Soldiers, and NCOs (noncommissioned officers),” said Lt. Gen. Kenneth E. Tovo, commander

of USASOC and presiding official of the ceremony. “On the other hand, I can think of no better man to assume the USASOC command sergeant major mantle of responsibility than Command Sgt. Maj. Robert Abernethy.”

Bequer graduated from the Special Forces Qualification course in 1984 as a Special Forces weapons sergeant (18B), and has since been assigned to; 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (A) and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan.

“Like the body’s backbone, the NCO Corps provides strength and rigidity to the Army’s organization and ensure that, as a force, we remain  
*continued on page 08*

**SYMBOLIC SABRE** Lt. Gen. Kenneth Tovo, USASOC commanding general, passes the symbolic sabre to the incoming command sergeant major, Command Sgt. Maj. Robert Abernethy during the change of command ceremony. This act symbolizes the responsibilities of the outgoing command sergeant major being passed to the incoming command sergeant major. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Kyle Fisch.

## Votel discusses special operations challenges

The “hyper connectivity” of the world today complicates an already complex set of global security issues, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, said at a security forum in Colorado, July 24.

Army Gen. Joseph L. Votel told Fox News correspondent Catherine Herridge that the problems of Russia, Daesh, formerly known as the Islamic State in the Levant, and state and non-state actors is made more complex because of the speed and ubiquity of communications.

The SOCOM commander said Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Crimea and eastern Ukraine must be countered. Russia’s use of conventional and non-conventional forces and the use of military and non-military governmental capabilities present problems beyond a simple military solution, the general said.

“They are using information operations, they are using their own military capabilities and they are using ethnic Russian populations in some of these countries as surrogates,” he said.

All this, Gen. Votel said, helps “perpetrate this idea of coercion and pressure on neighbors along their periphery to meet their particular objectives.”

Russia’s objective, Votel said, is to create a situation, where NATO cannot thrive. Russian President Vladimir Putin sees the North Atlantic Alliance as a threat, Votel said, and the Russian leader “is attempting to create these frozen conflicts and situations that are difficult to resolve along their border and in doing that stalemate a lot of things.”

Hybrid warfare is unconventional warfare and that’s in U.S. Special Operations Command’s wheelhouse, the general said. The command is working with NATO allies and partners to develop their capabilities, he said.

### FOCUSING ON DAESH

But most of SOCOM’s resources are focused on the Middle East and Central Asia, the general said, noting that focus now is on Daesh.

Daesh is a terrorist group with ambitions to be the new Caliphate, Votel said. The first Caliphate

extended from Spain, through North Africa and across to India.

The group is “looking for opportunities, where there is ungoverned spaces and vulnerable populations, and they are taking advantage of that,” he said.

When pressure is applied in one spot, Daesh moves to another, the general said.

“I don’t know if they have a plan, as such,” he said, “but what they are trying to do is re-establish that Caliphate by looking for opportunities they can exploit.”

Votel said the fight against Daesh and groups like it will require a long-term commitment. He cited Colombia and its 50-year fight against terrorism.

“I don’t believe there’s any one strategy that we are going to apply that is immediately going to change this,” the general said. “It’s going to take a long-term approach, understanding what is happening, making smart decisions and continuing to apply pressure — whether that is military pressure, diplomatic pressure, economic pressure, informational pressure against violent extremists.” — *By Jim Garamone, DoD News, Defense Media Activity.*

### Leahy Takes Command *continued from page 05*

Stepping back from the lectern, Rogers and Brennan shared a few words and a hand shake before Brennan spoke to the crowd.

“Thank you everyone for attending, but without a doubt, the most honored guests here today are those standing on Gabriel Field in front of me, celebrating them and their incredible achievements is why we are here,” said Brennan.

After a few moments of clapping and cheering for the Soldiers on the field, Brennan continued with his speech.

“You are the reason I get up and go to work every morning, I never stop thinking about ways to make your jobs easier and to help you be more effective on the battle field. I am extremely proud of you, and it has been my greatest honor and privilege to serve as your commander and carry the title of Legion 6 for the last two years,” said Brennan.

“It has been simply amazing and gratifying to work alongside of you and I am very proud of each and every one of you for your immense contributions to our national security,” expressed Brennan. “You give hope to the hopeless; you have freed the enslaved and brought training and skill to the unskilled so they may help themselves in their own countries.”

Brennan ended his speech by thanking everyone he had served with during his time as Legion 6, but had a special request to the crowd.

“Let us not forget those who are at this very moment currently overseas doing our nation’s bidding to keep us all safe, please keep them and their families in your thoughts and prayers.”

Leahy spoke last at the ceremony. “It is always an honor to stand here on Gabriel Field, surrounded by the trees memorializing our fallen. It is a great reminder for me as the sacrifices made by the Soldiers of this group and the incredible responsibility I have been given to command this organization.”

Leahy is no stranger to the unit or Fort Campbell. Having been stationed at Fort Campbell five times now, he knows the post and the Legion very well. Leahy served as a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha commander, company commander and battalion commander for the Legion.

“Colonel Brennan’s leadership has taken 5th Group to a new level and most importantly made life very difficult for our country’s enemies,” said Leahy. “John (Brennan), your impact will be long felt by 5th Group. To the Soldiers of 5th Group, I am honored once again to stand amongst you as part of this great organization. All command policies remain in effect, *de oppresso liber*,” — *by Sgt. Jacob Mahaffey, 5th SFG (A) Public Affairs.*

### USASOC Change of Responsibility *continued from page 07*

true and faithful to our legacy and to our core values,” Tovo said. “Simultaneously, they also ensure flexibility. Enabling the force to move and adjust when necessary.”

Tovo also spoke about the legacy Bequer leaves in his wake, as he departs active duty service saying: “Your contributions to the command and the people within it will continue to manifest itself for years to come.”

As Bequer passed the “reins” to Abernethy, he gave a brief speech thanking those in attendance and those who have helped him along the way.

“I’d like to thank the civilians of the USASOC community. Without them, that building would not function. They are incredible people. Most are retirees, and many are GS (General Schedule) employees,” Bequer said. “But what they do for us and what they do for the force is incredible.”

Upon concluding his speech, Bequer remarked about the organization he leaves behind and Abernethy is preparing to lead.

“The bottom line is it’s an incredible organization. It provides some of the finest SOF operators in the world and I honestly say this with no disrespect to any other organization, but I truly think there is no component that can match the U.S. Army Special Operations,” Bequer said. “There isn’t a mission we cannot do. I am honored and I thank you very much for letting me serve, thank you.”

As Abernethy approached the lectern, and thanked Bequer for his comments, he began his speech by thanking those in attendance and sharing a “fun-fact” about his career.

“It’s funny, because it is exactly 28 years ago today that I started my military career by loading a bus at Columbia, S.C., and I rode that bus down to Fort Benning, Ga.,” Abernethy said. “With that memory in mind, I can also tell you that I never envisioned standing in front of you today as the next USASOC command sergeant major.”

Abernethy entered the U.S. Army, July 22, 1987, as an Infantryman. During the course of his career, he has been assigned to; 3rd U.S. Infantry (The Old Guard), 1st SFG, 3rd SFG, 5th SFG, Special Warfare Center and School and Special Operations Command Central.

“This is truly a humbling experience, and I am honored to have been selected to serve the Soldiers of USASOC,” Abernethy said. “I understand the great responsibility and will do my best to represent our formations each and every day.” — *by Sgt. Kyle Fisch, USASOC Public Affairs.*



## ARSOF Regiments Welcome 12 New Members

On May 29, the Army Special Operations Regiments inducted 12 new Distinguished Members of the Regiment during a special ceremony in the John F. Kennedy Auditorium, Kennedy Hall, Fort Bragg, N.C. Distinguished Members of the Regiment serve as a link between those members currently serve and those who have served in the past.



### Psychological Operations Regiment Dr. Morris Janowitz and Barbara Lauwers Podoski

**Dr. Morris Janowitz** entered the U.S. Army as an enlisted Soldier and volunteered for service in the Office of Strategic Services in 1943 with his first assignment at the Research and Analysis Branch, where he was tasked to conduct research in support of psychological warfare against Nazi Germany. This study of mass communications and propaganda greatly benefitted the allied efforts. His follow-on assignment was to the Psychological Warfare Division at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in London and later Paris. Dr. Janowitz, continued as a consultant with the U.S. Army first with the Office of Psychological Warfare and then with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Analysis in support of Special Operations. In 1951, asked by Maj. Gen. Robert A. McClure, then-Chief of the Office of Psychological Warfare, he

collaborated with William Daugherty at the Johns Hopkins University Operational Research Office to write instructional studies for psychological warfare instruction.

**Barbara Lauwers Podoski** joined the Women's Army Corps in 1943 and was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services Morale Operations. Working from a base in Italy, she conceived some of the most creative propaganda of World War II. Her most significant contribution came in July 1944; she is credited as one of the architects of Operation Sauerkraut. Lauwers designed a complete campaign in which former disgruntled Nazi POWs were turned into successful OSS agents. She later worked at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., before joining the Library of Congress as a research analyst. She retired in 1968 after 20 years of service.



### Special Forces Regiment

Col. Richard M. Ripley, Lt. Col. Darrell Elmore, Sgt. Maj. Lothar Williams,  
Master Sgt. Gary Gordon and Sgt. 1st Class Randall Shugart

A veteran of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, **Col. Richard M. Ripley** enlisted in 1942 and was sent to the Field Artillery Reception Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. After graduating from the Field Artillery Officer Candidate School in 1943, he was sent to the 22nd Armored FA Battalion, 4th Armored Division, where he saw action during the Normandy, Northern France and Central Europe Campaigns. He was assigned to the newly created Psychological Warfare Center as chief of the Special Forces Department. He was responsible for developing the forerunner to today's Special Forces Qualification Course. In 1970, he served as the assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance.

**Darrell "Moe" Elmore** enlisted in the United States Army in 1956. He volunteered for Special Forces, studying foreign weapons, military free fall and combat diving. Elmore later served in southeast Asia for a total of eight years, first with the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Okinawa and then in the Republic of Vietnam with the 5th SFG(A), where he served as a recon team leader with Detachment B-50, (Project Omega); commanded a Mike Force company in the II Corps Mobile Strike Force; and Detachment B-52, (Project Delta). He received a direct commission while serving in Project Delta. He became an early member of 1st Special Forces Operations Detachment-Delta.

**Sergeant Major Lothar Williams** was born on June 10, 1943 in Germany. He immigrated to the United States, arriving on March 3, 1960 and took up residence with his parents in Tacoma, Wash. Williams was inducted into the Army in Seattle, Wash. In 1966, he volunteered for Special Forces training, and in April 1967 he was assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as a Special Forces weapons specialist in Bad Toelz, Germany. In

June 1968, as a staff sergeant, he transferred to the advanced element of the 10th Special Forces Group (A) to Fort Devens, Mass., where he served with ODA 226, which he remained a member of until August 1969, when he was transferred to the 5th Special Forces Group (A), located at Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam. He received Special Forces Advanced Combat Orientation Training, and was selected, boarded, and recruited by Project Delta (Recon), Williams spent much of his career with the 10th SF Group training foreign partners in unconventional warfare.

**Master Sgt. Gary Gordon**, a native of Lincoln, Maine, was a special operations Soldier assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for valorous actions while deployed in support of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Gordon distinguished himself by actions above and beyond the call of duty on Oct. 3, 1993. Gordon and Shugart received permission to perform the volunteer mission.

**Sergeant First Class Randall "Randy" Shugart** was born Aug. 13, 1958 in Lincoln, Neb., to a U.S. Air Force family. A member of Junior ROTC in Newville High School in Pennsylvania, he enlisted in the U.S. Army upon graduation. His first assignment was with the 2nd Ranger Battalion in 1978. He left active duty in 1980, joining the U.S. Army Reserves; however, three years later, he returned to active duty, volunteering for Special Forces. In 1986, he volunteered for the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta where he rose to the status of assistant team sergeant. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for valorous actions while deployed in support of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Gordon distinguished himself by actions above and beyond the call of duty on Oct. 3, 1993.



## Civil Affairs Regiment

Maj. Gen. Steven J. Hashem, Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Matthews, Col. John W. Geiger and Col. Robert T. Frame

**Maj. Gen. Steven J. Hashem** was born in Concord, N.H., in 1952. Upon graduation from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1974, Maj. Gen. Hashem was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army. Maj. Gen. Hashem's career includes time spent in the conventional force with the 6th Infantry Division, Federal Republic of Germany, as well as an assistant professorship at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1985, then-Captain (P) Hashem transferred from the Active Component to the Reserve Component and joined the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade in Norristown, Pa. Shortly after joining the 358th, he branch transferred to Civil Affairs and also became qualified in Psychological Operations. Maj. Gen. Hashem served in a variety of CA leadership roles, in multiple units, deploying in support of numerous contingency operations around the globe, including support to Operation Desert Storm in Saudia Arabia and Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia. In 2000, Maj. Gen. Hashem was selected as Commander, 2nd Psychological Operations Group in Cleveland, Ohio, with a follow-on assignment as Commander, 353rd Civil Affairs Command in Staten Island, N.Y., where he developed and implemented a comprehensive 30-day pre-deployment training program that was selected as the model for all future OIF deployment training for the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. In 2004, he deployed to Iraq as Commander, Task Force 353 and Director, Civil-Military Operations Directorate, Multi-National Force Iraq. Upon his return to the United States, he was dual-hatted as President Joint Special Operations University and Director, Training, Knowledge and Futures for the United States Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base. He was hand-picked by the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command to establish a combat development and "think tank" directorate to better address the institutional and intellectual functions and responsibilities of a traditionally operations-focused Combatant Command.

In 2011, he was assigned as Director, Coalition Coordination with the United States Central Command where he was responsible for coordinating international support to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, serving as the primary interface between senior leaders from 60 nations and USCENTCOM leadership, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff and other stakeholders. Upon retirement, he returned to his civilian career at Lockheed Martin, retiring in 2013. He currently is an executive consultant, serving on a number of boards and non-profits.

**Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring**, the son of Swedish immigrants, was born in New Rochelle, N.Y., on March 27, 1895. He was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant in the regular Army in October 1917.

Hilldring served with the 38th Infantry Regiment in World War I, seeing combat in the Aisne, Aisne-Marne and Champagne-Marne campaigns. For his actions on July 22, 1918, 1st Lt. Hilldring earned the Distinguished Service Cross for bravery under fire. After the cessation of hostilities, he served with the 355th Infantry Regiment performing occupation duties on the Rhine.

Returning stateside, Hilldring served in a variety of assignments and advanced through the required Army schooling before being sent to the 57th Infantry Regiment in the Philippine Islands. After completing this tour and Command and Staff School in 1936, he was assigned to command the Civilian Conservation Corps in the Arizona District.

Between 1939 and 1942, Hilldring rose in rank from major to brigadier general and was responsible for a variety of functions of the War Department G1. Although assuming the position as the first Commanding General of the 84th Infantry Division in June of 1942, he did not take it into combat. He was instead assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff Special Staff in March 1943 as the Director of the Civil Affairs Division. Hilldring served as the CAD's first and only

commander. He was the U.S. delegate to the Potsdam Conference. As a compromise between the U.S. War Department and the U.S. State Department, on April 18, 1946, Hilldring resigned his commission and was named Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, a civilianization of the position of CAD. He resigned from the State Department in the spring of 1947 and embarked on a new career as a business executive with General Aniline and Film, a Swiss firm. In 1955, he rose to the position of president of the firm. He died in 1974.

**Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Matthews**, U.S. Army Retired, entered the Army in May 1967. After completion of Air Defense Artillery School in Fort Bliss, Texas, his initial assignment was assistant operations officer in Fallon, Nevada.

Maj. Gen. Matthews earned a bachelor's of science in economics from La Salle College; a master's in public administration from Temple University; and was a Distinguished Senior Fellow from the U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Special Operations University. Maj. Gen. Matthews has served with distinction in numerous positions of responsibility in the United States Army, the United States Army Reserve and the Civil Affairs Branch during his 41-year career. Maj. Gen. Matthews' service has included tours in Naples, Italy, as chief, Civil Military Operations, Joint Task Force Provide Promise. He was the first general officer to Command the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade and Senior Civil Affairs Advisor to the U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Va. He has served as Commander, 353rd Civil Affairs Command and as Chief, Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation, where he was the Commander, United States Theater Civil Affairs Implementation Force, Bosnia /Herzegovina. His last assignment was as the Vice Commander of the Joint Warfighting Center and Commander OCP 2, Fifth Army/Army North.

**Col. John Geiger** graduated from the United States Military Academy in June 1966. His first assignment, after Airborne and Ranger schools, was with the 5th Battalion, 23rd Infantry, 173rd Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) at Fort Richardson, Alaska, where he served in a variety of leadership positions from company-to-battalion levels. In July 1968, Col. Geiger, assigned to the First Infantry Division, in the Republic of Vietnam, was made the division's liaison officer to the Capital Military Assistance Command. Returning stateside, he was stationed at Fort Eustis, Va., where he instructed Combined Arms and Tactics at the U.S. Army Transportation School.

Leaving active duty, Col. Geiger joined the Army Reserve in the 85th Division (Training) in Des Plaines, Ill., in August 1971. Serving in the 3290th USAR School in Nashville, Tenn., before being transferred with the Department of Energy to South Carolina, he joined the 120th Army Reserve Command, serving in various capacities. In 1986, he joined the 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, also known as "Thurmond's Brigade," as the assistant chief of staff, economics and commerce. Three years later, Col. Geiger was selected as the first comptroller of the headquarters that was the predecessor of the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command at Fort Bragg, N.C. Col. Geiger graduated from the United States Military Academy in June 1966. His first assignment, after Airborne and Ranger schools, was with the 5th Battalion, 23rd Infantry, 173rd Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) at Fort Richardson, Alaska, where he served in a variety of leadership positions from company-to-battalion levels. In July 1968, Col. Geiger, assigned to the First Infantry Division, in the Republic of Vietnam, was made the division's liaison officer to the Capital Military Assistance Command. Returning stateside, he was stationed at Fort Eustis, Va., where he instructed Combined Arms and Tactics at the U.S. Army Transportation School.

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## Healy inducted as Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment

On Thursday, July 23, Maj. Gen. James B. Linder, Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, presided over an induction ceremony naming Maj. Gen. (Retired) Michael D. Healy a Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment.

The ceremony, held at the Jacksonville Golf and Country Club in Jacksonville, Florida, was attended by many Vietnam-era Soldiers who served with "Col. Mike" during the Vietnam War. Maj. Gen. Healy spoke fondly of "his boys" and of the love he had for them. He noted that he prayed for those Soldiers he lost in war.

Healy, a native of Chicago, Illinois, enlisted in the U.S. Army at the age of 19, and was assigned to several units including the 1st Cavalry Division in Japan performing occupation duty.

During the Korean War, Healy, a then-lieutenant, served as a company commander with the 4th Airborne Ranger Company, participating in the airborne operation at Munsan-Ni, a tiny village in South Korea. It was here he received his nickname "Iron Mike." While his 3rd Platoon was pinned down and under heavy fire, he and four others weaved their way through the trenches to hold the high ground until reinforcements arrived. From Korea, he attended a variety of military schools, and was recruited as Chief, Special Warfare Operations and Foreign Intelligence Branch for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

In 1963, Healy served the first of five tours in Vietnam. Assigned as the Executive Officer and Special Assistant to the Deputy U.S. Ambassador of Vietnam, he was instrumental in the initial formation and employment of the Civil Operations



**IT'S AN HONOR** Maj. Gen. James B. Linder presents Maj. Gen. Michael D. Healy with the Distinguished Member of the Special Forces Regiment certificate during a ceremony in his honor. *U.S. Army photo.*

Rural Development Project, which was the successor to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. CORDS proved to be a highly successful counterinsurgency program. He also served as the Commander of Special Troops and Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, XXIV Corps and as Commander of the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta. Three weeks after returning to the U.S., he was recalled to Vietnam, and named the commander of 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), a position he would hold for 20 months. Gaining his first star, he was then assigned the Chief of the Pacific Division and Deputy Director of Operations Directorate before being named the Assistant Division Commander, 82nd Airborne Division. Healy's final

assignment in Vietnam was with the 2nd Regional Assistance Command, Military Region Two.

After Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Healy began a three year tour as the commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance/U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance. Although charged by the conventional Army to dismantle special operations, he, instead, instituted changes such as streamlining training, shifting focus to counterterrorism operations and pumping up the operational units' infrastructures. He not only ensured the continued sustainment of Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, but also increased its value. Furthermore, he raised morale and competencies of the Soldiers, cadre and students. Leaving Fort Bragg, he was assigned as the Chief of Staff of Combined Military Planning, Ankara, Turkey, given charge for all joint military maneuvers around the Middle East oil fields. His last assignment was as Commander of the Army Readiness Region V at Ft. Sheridan, Illinois, where he had enlisted as a private. He retired on Feb. 28, 1981.

Maj. Gen. Healy's awards and decorations include: Distinguished Service Medal (three awards), Silver Star Medal (two awards), Legion of Merit with three oak-leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star with "V" device and six oak-leaf clusters, Air Medal with "V" device (4th Award), Army Commendation Medal (3rd award), Navy Commendation Medal with "V" device, Purple Heart (two awards), Good Conduct Medal, Southeast Asia Service Medal with Star, French Legion of Honor Medal, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Vietnamese Civic Action Honor Medal, Combat Infantryman Badge with Star, Master Parachutist Badge and Special Forces Tab. — *USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office.*

## ARSOF Regiments Welcome 12 New Members *continued from page 10*

Energy to South Carolina, he joined the 120th Army Reserve Command, serving in various capacities. In 1986, he joined the 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, also known as "Thurmond's Brigade," as the assistant chief of staff, economics and commerce. Three years later, Col. Geiger was selected as the first comptroller of the headquarters that was the predecessor of the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command at Fort Bragg, N.C.

**Col. Robert T. Frame** was born in Doylestown, Pa. In 1985, he received a direct commission in the U.S. Army Dental Corps. Col. Frame's initial Army service began in 1971, as an enlisted member of the Puerto Rico National Guard. He attended basic training and Advanced Infantry Training at Fort Jackson, S.C., with follow-on service in the Delaware National Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Following Col. Frame's selection for Dental Corps commissioning, he completed the Army Medical Department Officer Basic Course. His first commissioned service was in U.S. Army Reserve medical units. In 1992, he joined the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion in Greensboro, N.C. While in the 422nd, he completed the Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course.

In 1996, Col. Frame began an extended period of Civil Affairs mission deployments. This began in Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he was Chief of Staff for the Mostar Regional Office of the Organization

for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He next was the Public Health Officer for the Allied Command, Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps, Bosnia. In 2002, he became Public Health Team Chief in Kabul, Afghanistan for the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operation Task Force, Operation Enduring Freedom. Early in 2003, Col. Frame deployed to Iraq as the Chief of the Public Health Team of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command. On April 27, 2003, he was grievously wounded when the medical advisory team he was with was attacked in downtown Baghdad. During his career in Civil Affairs Col. Frame successfully implemented many Public Health projects that contributed significantly to the missions at hand. In 2006, following an extended period of care at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Col. Frame retired from the Army. He returned to his civilian employer, the U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Previously, he was in the VA in a Senior Executive Service position of Assistant Under Secretary for Health for Dentistry, the highest ranking dentist in the VA. Upon return to the VA, Col. Frame became the National Liaison for OEF/OIF Returning Warriors, where he was responsible for a broad range of services to assist returning combat veterans and their families with their readjustment to civilian life and in the bereavement process. Col. Frame is now retired from his service at the VA. — *USAJFKSWCS Public Affairs Office.*



# HARNESSING CYBER-TECHNOLOGY'S HUMAN POTENTIAL

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL (P) PATRICK DUGGAN

Is the U.S. military fully harnessing the power of Cyber-technology for its human potential in conflict? Are strategists thinking differently about innovating technology for shaping the human aspects of military operations<sup>1</sup> versus developing technology for technology's sake? These are important questions to ponder in today's hyper-connected landscape. Successfully deterring or waging conflict in Cyberspace will require fresh ideas about human-technology innovation and new concepts to fuse fractured military capability. Using live-streaming technology as just one example, this article argues that the German military's inability to envision live-video's human potential in the 1930s coupled with Russia's modern day mastery of information-warfare video tactics, provides insightful lessons about military innovation at the nexus of human and Cyber. Capturing those lessons, a new concept like "swarm-stream" teams could employ aggressive offensive strategies like micro-targeting, disinformation attack and Cyber-smash mouth tactics to break an adversary's human-tech information advantage. If successfully developed, "swarm-stream" teams provide a prototype for unconventional thinking and offer strategic opportunities for tamping down conflict with humans in Cyberspace.

## The Conflict-Cyberspace-Human Connection


Conflict has and always will be a human enterprise. Conflict is a clash of human wills driven by passions like hatred, enmity, and fear, and is a struggle that begins and ends in the minds of men.<sup>2</sup> While the human nature of conflict is timeless, conflict's characteristics frequently change. Cyberspace is the latest characteristic to change and is fast becoming the dominant arena where human conflicts play out. Fortunately for humans, Cyberspace is not simply a technical abstraction or man-made domain unto itself. Instead, Cyberspace is a domain of human practice involving the actions and decisions of humans.<sup>3</sup> Cyberspace extends and reflects human actions, attitudes, behaviors, and decisions, and is rapidly becoming the preferred venue for how humans engage one another on a daily basis. Technologies like social media, virtual clouds, and smart devices have hyper-enabled human engagement and ushered in "a new paradigm shift in communication where everyone in the world practically has the capability to talk with everyone else simultaneously."<sup>4</sup> As the proliferation of increasingly advanced and inexpensive Cyber-technology continues, so too does the notion of "many to many" communication, allowing any consumer of information to also become a producer.<sup>5</sup> The 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy describes a global information environment where individuals have access "to more information than entire governments once possessed" and "can swiftly organize and act on what they learn, sometimes leading to violent change."<sup>6</sup> These complex webs of information connect humans to one another, humans to machines, and humans to the world, while providing a simultaneous, multidirectional, and information-rich domain of human practice. In short, Cyberspace is teeming with boundless human potential for the U.S. military to harness in future conflict.

## 1930s Germany

The act of video live-streaming is not new. Cellular and wireless technology are just recent improvements to the first public video-telephone service dating back to 1936 Germany.<sup>7</sup> Between 1936-1939 the German *Reichspost*, or National Post Office, laid coaxial cables linking Berlin to Nuremberg, Munich, and Hamburg providing the first public video-telephone service.<sup>8</sup> Ground-breaking for its time, the *Reichspost* built special booths, known as *Gegensehn-Fernsprechanlage* or visual telephone system,<sup>9</sup> each outfitted with eight-inch monitors<sup>10</sup> capable of capturing video images up to 180 pixels<sup>11</sup> an inch at 25 frames per second.<sup>12</sup> This is respectable technology considering transmission limitations of the day and as compared to the modern-day iPhone 6 which captures 441 pixels per inch at up to 60 frames per second.<sup>13</sup> The *Reichspost* had plans to expand the service<sup>14</sup> across Germany and other foreign cities but was preempted by World War II and voices advocating for other communication mediums of the time. In military circles, television was aggressively pursued for miniaturization in traditional military tasks like, visual guidance systems for bombs and rockets, remote controls, and air reconnaissance.<sup>15</sup> By the end of the war and despite catastrophic German losses, Allied intelligence reported on one German factory doggedly developing the technology, “producing 300 miniature cameras a month...for the still-experimental television missile guidance program.”<sup>16</sup> Dealing another blow to early video-telephone innovation, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, threw his ministry’s weight behind developing televisions, where he preferred them to be built large in public settings where the general audience was believed to be more susceptible to propaganda and persuasion.<sup>17</sup> So in the end, the German war machine forewent early video-telephone innovation and instead repurposed its cables for more staid telegraph and broadcast television technologies.<sup>18</sup>

## Lessons learned

Although the Germans were arguably overcome by the events and resource decisions of World War Two, the possibilities for early video-telephone’s human focused



**VISUAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM** in 1936, Dr. Georg Schubert, an engineer working for the German post office, developed the world’s first public video telephone service and called it the *Gegebehn-Fernsprechanlage*. *The Museum of Public Relations*.

innovation are valuable to consider.

Since the Germans made the connection between innovating television technology for traditional targeting and air reconnaissance, could the Germans have made an eventual connection between miniaturizing portable video-telephones and military espionage, unconventional warfare, and support to covert or clandestine actions? Considering the Germans had plans to expand their larger static video-telephone service abroad, could the Germans have innovated portable desk-sized versions for more human-intensive activities? The Germans could have harnessed portable video-phones to pass human intelligence, coordinate surrogate and proxy actions, direct guerrilla warfare networks, and a gamut of disruption and sabotage activities that would have benefitted from real-time visual transmission. Real-time video transmission of maps, coordinates, pictures, and added face to face context would have certainly enhanced strategic military options.

Secondly, since the Germans made the connection between employing television, movie, and radio for mass-propaganda, would they have made an eventual connection for using video-telephones as a personalized delivery means for propaganda? Con-

sidering the Germans had plans to expand their video-telephone service abroad, would the psychological impact of communication over video to select individuals have made it more compelling versus its delivery by radio or telephone?

Regardless of “what ifs” or whether miniaturized portable video-telephones would have even mattered on the whole, the key lesson for modern-day strategists is that, today, in a hyper-connected landscape filled with Cyber-technology and smart devices, strategists possess an advantage World War II Germans did not...time. Today, U.S. military strategists have the time to think differently and explore new ways to exploit human dynamics with a growing zoo of technologies...and today, countries like Russia are doing just that.

## Russia in Eastern Ukraine

As recently witnessed in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s views on conflict have evolved over the last two decades, spurring the military innovation to be successful. In Spring 2014, Russia infiltrated small teams of unmarked Spetznaz, or Special Forces, across the Ukrainian border to seize government buildings and weapons armories, and then turn them over to

pro-Russian separatist militias.<sup>19</sup> Testifying before the Senate Armed Service Committee, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright decried Russia's actions asserting Russia had "fundamentally changed security calculations on the continent – and marked the first time since World War II that European borders have been altered by force."<sup>20</sup> While Russia's choreographed information warfare campaign was powered by small SOF teams and local militias on the ground, it was virtually promoted by Russian funded "troll armies" posting pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian comments on social media, blogs, and news sites.<sup>21</sup> Russia bankrolled a "\$19 million dollar budget to employ 600 people whose daily tasks included commenting on 50 news articles, managing six Facebook accounts with three posts a day, managing 10 Twitter accounts, and tweeting 50 times a day."<sup>22</sup> At the national level, the Kremlin surged the budget of their state controlled news, Russia Today (RT), to over \$300 million in 2014 with plans to increase by 41% in the future.<sup>23</sup> Russia masterfully orchestrated propaganda efforts like dubious on the ground "exclusive-videos," Cyber trolls, and state run media and comprehensively exploited Russian ethnicity, language, history, values, culture, and identities to fracture Ukrainian populations. The Russians vertically integrated Cyber-disinformation to systematically exploit human nature, resulting in the successful invasion of the Ukraine without the West firing a shot.

"The Russian view of information war is notably broader than any Western conception."<sup>24</sup> The Russian military interlaces two components, the information-technical for exploiting Cyber technologies and the information psychological for exploiting the battle of human wills.<sup>25</sup> The Russian evolution of information warfare theory has been poignantly captured in *Recasting Redstar* by Timothy L. Thomas of the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, who chronicles Russia's aggressive military reforms since the Soviet Union's demise. The author cites several prominent Russian strategists and military experts who have called for broad and comprehensive reforms to sharpen Russia's information and influence capabilities against perceived Western aggression. In particular, Dr. Igor Panarin, the head

of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis Center of Military Forecasting and Russian Information Warfare, proposes a number of organizational, institutional, and training reforms to sharpen Russia's information warfare capabilities, including the development of new stand-alone "Information Special Forces."<sup>26</sup> These information Special Forces would execute contingency planning, preparation, and possible actions

## TROLL ARMY

A state-sponsored team of commentators, using false identities, that participate in blogs, internet forums and social media to promote propaganda with the intention of swaying opinion, undermining dissident communities or changing the perception of what is the dominant view.

for influencing human nature under specific situations.<sup>27</sup> Similar proposals describe special information troops as composite teams composed of expert operators, communication personnel, journalists, writers, translators, web designers, and hackers that would leverage state and military media to wage information warfare.<sup>28</sup>

Even the Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, in 2013 openly corroborated Russia's thoughts on effective modern-day conflict as "a game-changing new generation of warfare whose strategic value would exceed the "power of force of weapons in their effectiveness."<sup>29</sup> As the se-

nior ranking officer in the Russian military, General Gerasimov called for the use of SOF, internal opposition, and informational actions, devices, and means to nullify enemy advantages and create a permanent operating front through the entire territory of an enemy state.<sup>30</sup> In other words, Russia carefully choreographs Cyber-disinformation "between the states of war and peace"<sup>31</sup> to exploit human tensions. As a result, Russia succeeded in the occupation of a signature partner-nation of the European Union without sparking any meaningful Western military response.

## Lessons learned

Russia's military actions in Eastern Ukraine should not have surprised anyone, as their perspective on conflict was portended. "The Internet and social media are seen by Russian theorists as key game-changers in the weaponization of information."<sup>32</sup> Russia horizontally integrated the functions of SOF, information warfare, and Cyber in a manner that was deliberately designed to fracture Ukrainian populations. Russia methodically targeted Ukrainian human dynamics to drive wedges between social, ethnic, linguistic, and identity differences between Eastern and Western Ukrainian populations. Furthermore, Russia's evolution of military writing clearly suggest that they have re-structured key military functions into composite teams at the tactical level composed of SOF, information warfare practitioners, and Cyber-technicians.

The second lesson is that Russia also vertically integrated all levels of state sponsored propaganda, often using video promulgated by Cyber. Russia kept its adversaries off balance with a persistent deluge of decentralized but vertically reinforcing propaganda. "The aim of this new propaganda is not to convince or persuade, but to keep the viewer hooked and distracted, passive and paranoid, rather than agitated to action."<sup>33</sup> Russia used contrived and fabricated videos employing "techniques of psychological conditioning designed to excite extreme emotions of aggression and hatred in the viewer."<sup>34</sup> Fast moving videos depicting violence and horrific scenes accompanied by alarming music is a form of neurolinguistics programming that can leave individuals open to suggestion.<sup>35</sup>

In summary, Russia succeeded in horizontally integrating key military functions at the same time they vertically integrated its state run propaganda; often, Russia personalized the psychological experience with targeted video propaganda.

## Swarm Stream teams

During a Senate Armed Services Testimony in spring 2015, the USSOCOM Commander, Gen. Joseph Votel, cited Russia as “adept at avoiding conventional military responses while advancing their interests through a combination of coercion, targeted violence, and exploitation of local issues...and is systematically undermining neighboring governments and complicating international responses to its aggressive actions.”<sup>36</sup> Gen. Votel called for new thinking on unconventional strategies to leverage the unrealized potential of Cyberspace, including the development of proficiency in social media to recruit humans to causes and the cultivation of decentralized and participatory human networks.<sup>37</sup> In short, it is senior officer recognition that it takes unconventional Cyber-strategies to defeat unconventional Cyber-strategies, and that the U.S. must innovate Cyber-technology for its human potential to deter or wage tomorrow’s conflict.

Live-stream technology is just one of many technologies that can be innovated in an unconventional manner and should be considered in the portfolio of strategic deterrents. However, to innovate, the U.S. military must think beyond just using live-video for mission command. Today’s countless video-telecommunication conferences between units, commanders, and staffs is something even a transplanted World War II-era German officer would recognize. Instead, the U.S. military should consider the concept of “swarm-stream” teams, whose real-world, real-time, human-intensive mission would be threat oriented. These teams would aggressively feed viral-video across Cyberspace. Similar to the Russians, the teams would focus on exploiting the human aspects of a given situation, but with the goal of breaking their opponent’s messages, mediums, or monopoly of propaganda. The teams would actively counter, undermine, and attack an opponent’s message using new tactics of their own and would be the conceptual

fusing of SOF, Cyber, IO, and psychological operations functions into a truly new Cyber-unconventional capability.

## Tactics

**Disinformation attack:** Swarm-stream teams would employ offensive disinformation attack to aggressively take down or “dox”<sup>38</sup> an adversary’s forged videos, blogs, websites, and social media sites. A cadre

### SWARM STREAM TEAMS

A threat-oriented team of people aggressively feeding viral-video across cyberspace with the goal of breaking their opponents messages, mediums or monopoly of propaganda to actively counter, undermine and attack an opponent’s message.

of “counter-propaganda experts...would pick apart what might be called all the news unfit to print”<sup>39</sup> and digitally map and track an adversary’s larger propaganda network. Once the teams illuminate an adversary’s false information network, they could either employ low grade Cyber-tools to destroy it in private or could publicly blow the network’s cover, revealing true identities and associations. Live-video would be a key tool for not just shaming the adversary, but his networks and influencers who made and disseminated them.<sup>40</sup>

Another disinformation attack tactic is to flood select areas with smart mobile devices

and technology. This would give civilians and partners the ability to wage a powerfully effective native and organic form of disinformation attack. Civilians and partners could video, photo, upload, and wage their own crowd-sourced, disaggregated video battles against an adversary. Any geo-tagged data would also serve as the foundation for building nonstandard domains for future options.

The last disinformation tactic is for teams to support select proxy and surrogate efforts to execute low grade Cyber-attacks against adversary websites, social media, and content generators by using less advanced customizable source codes according to specific situations.

**Micro-targeting:** Swarm-stream teams would employ micro-targeting, which involves the “identification and surgical engagement of specific individuals for either kinetic or non-kinetic means.”<sup>41</sup> Teams would penetrate and data-mine information relating to individuals to better understand what actions would have the desired effect for a given individual, as well as locate a given individual with precision.<sup>42</sup> Non-kinetic micro-targeting for individuals would leverage multi-disciplined pools of information focused on teasing out any human dynamics to discover an individual’s video-based vulnerabilities. Micro-targeting at the tactical level would employ mobile applications, analytic tools, and smart technology for the diffusion of timely information into viral-video fed Cyber-streams.

**Cyber-smash mouth:** Finally, swarm-stream teams would employ unconventional Cyber-smash mouth tactics, which colloquially, “takes the gloves off” in a variety of areas. Teams could build and employ surrogate, internally sourced, or outsourced communities of practice that attack an adversary’s messages in native language with spam and viral-video with the intent of fragmenting polarized identities. As messages and video are repeatedly viewed and forwarded across an adversary’s network, the intent is to cause shame, demoralize, and traumatize leadership into taking psychologically impaired actions. The team would attempt to undermine an adversary’s credibility, influence, and power to the point of leadership neutralizing themselves, as well as, encourage adversaries to turn on their own members in search of “moles” and “traitors.”

## Conclusion

Conflict remains a violent struggle amongst and between people that is only getting more complex. The U.S. military must update its mindset about technology innovation if it hopes to harness Cyberspace's vast human potential for future conflict. Creating strategic opportunities

may require the consolidation of fractured capabilities across the disparate functions of SOF, information warfare, psychological operations, and Cyber into new elements like "swarm-stream" teams, which are but one prototype of future human-tech innovation. As witnessed by Russia's recent actions, successfully waging or deterring

conflict will require mastering the human aspects of Cyberspace. **SW**

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## Notes

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# Potential Impact of Daesh Attacks Spreading to Lebanon and Bahrain

BY USSOCOM J2

One of Daesh's, formerly the Islamic State in the Levant, most dangerous courses of action would be to expand its pattern of targeting Shia mosques into Bahrain and Lebanon. Such attacks would likely have a disproportionately high impact on U.S. and partner interests. There is a high risk that attacks with significant Shia civilian casualties would prompt retaliatory sectarian violence in both countries. Sectarian violence in either country has the risk of drawing in Iran or Saudi Arabia at some level. Given Daesh's history and recent pattern of external operations, such attacks are likely in the near term.

Daesh, and its precursor al-Qaeda in Iraq, have an established history of attacking prominent Shia civilian targets to provoke sectarian violence. The group then leverages any subsequent retaliatory violence to reinforce the Daesh narrative that it is actively defending Sunnis. AQI used this tactic to expand across western Iran in 2006 after it destroyed the Shia "Golden Mosque" in Samarra. Over 1,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in the cycle in of Sunni-Shia retaliatory attacks sparked by the destruction of the Mosque. AQI leveraged this violence to better establish itself within Iraq's Sunni community.

Daesh operations in Lebanon or Bahrain are very likely to employ a similar targeting strategy. In the region, Daesh had already publically claimed the May attacks on Shia mosques in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In mid-July, Daesh killed more than 100 civilians with large VBIED attack on a Shia market in Diayala province. In its claim of responsibility for the attack, the Daesh

spokesman said the attack was in response to the death of Sunni in the Kirkuk at the hands of the Shia Popular Mobilization Forces.

It is very likely there are already Daesh elements in both Bahrain and Lebanon conducting pre-operational planning. In Lebanon, Daesh elements have confronted the Lebanese Armed Forces and Lebanese Hezbollah in the Aarsal area and the Al Qalamun border area. Lebanese press sources report local security service believe Daesh has established a network of sleeper cells and supporters across into northern Lebanon and in the Palestinian refugee camps. Reportedly, Daesh intends to use this network to build a supportive network among the Sunni in Lebanon to spread west towards Tripoli. In Bahrain, social media users affiliated with Daesh commented that it would be next following the mosque attack in Kuwait. The Bahraini government has increased security around mosques across the country and has met with Sunni and Shia religious leaders to better secure potential religious targets.


Existing local and regional dynamics in Lebanon and Bahrain make them more vulnerable to sectarian violence following a terror attack. Both countries have recent histories of Sunni-Shia violence and deep distrust between the local populations. In Lebanon, young Sunni from the Tripoli region have admitted they have joined Nusra Front or Daesh in response to the "injustice committed against their people by Hezbollah." There is fear among Lebanese elites that aggressive Hezbollah responses to Daesh activity in or around Lebanon, something likely in the event of an attack on Shia civilians, will radicalize more young Sunnis. In Bahrain, the critics of the government asserted that the regime destruction of 38 Shia mosques over the last four years "set an example for others, including the Daesh terrorist group, to do so elsewhere." In late May, the anti-government 14 February Youth Revolution group accused the government of intentionally

allowing Daesh to operate in Bahrain to incite conflict to serve its own political interests. These comments suggest that the occasionally violent anti-government protests common in Bahrain since the 2011 "Arab Spring" would expand following an Daesh attack with significant Shia casualties. In both countries there is a higher risk that one or two successful Daesh attacks could spark an escalating spiral of conflict that eventually provides Daesh room to expand.

Exacerbating the internal Sunni-Shia tensions is the risk that sectarian violence in either country could spur outside intervention on behalf of their co-religionists. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have provided varying levels of support to allies in Lebanon and Bahrain. In the event of significant Sunni-Shia violence, both states are likely to increase their support to their allies or proxies. This has the potential to trigger a larger Sunni-Shia escalatory dynamic with the risks for broader regional unrest, the diversion of resources away from the current Daesh fight, and the creation of new Daesh opportunities for future expansion.

Critical to preventing sectarian retaliation in response to Daesh attacks in either country will be the public perception of the security forces' behavior. In Lebanon, if Lebanese Hezbollah is seen as leading the response to an Daesh attack there is a much higher risk for Sunni-Shia violence. The more the multi-confessional Lebanese Armed Forces leads in preventing or responding to an attack, the lower the risk of wider violence. In Bahrain, more aggressive public efforts to crack-down on Daesh and actively protect Shia facilities are the best options to mitigate potential sectarian retaliation to an Daesh attack. **SW**

**PRIME TARGET** The Golden Mosque in Samara, Iraq days after the landmark was bombed. U.S. Army photo Spc. Waine D. Haley.




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# THE GRAY

# ZONE

BY PHILIP KAPUSTA

A CENTURY OF WAR AND GRAY ZONE CHALLENGES



Defining Gray Zone Challenges

Gray zone security challenges, which are *competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality*, are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks. They exist short of a formal state of war, and present novel complications for U.S. policy and interests in the 21st century. The United States has a well-developed vocabulary, doctrine and mental models to describe war and peace, but the numerous gray zone challenges in between defy easy categorization.

Gray zone challenges are understood as a pooling of diverse conflicts exhibiting common characteristics. Combining these challenges does not imply a single solution, since each situation contains unique actors and aspects. Overall, gray zone challenges rise above normal, everyday peacetime geo-political competition and are *aggressive, perspective-dependent and ambiguous*.

As the world's leading superpower and *de facto* guarantor of the current world order, American national security interests span the globe and intersect with numerous circumstances fitting the definition of gray zone challenges. However, many of these challenges exist independent of U.S. agency or action and do not merit American involvement (e.g. civil conflicts in Africa). Accordingly, this paper acknowledges and briefly discusses the larger construct of gray zone challenges across the world, but it focuses on the United States' national security interests and those

gray zone challenges such as Russian actions in eastern Ukraine and Daesh, formerly the Islamic State in the Levant, that are relevant to America today.


Gray Zone Challenges – The new and old normal

The U.S. government can improve its ability to operate effectively in the gray zone between war and peace by reshaping its intellectual, organizational and institutional models. America's conventional military dominance and status as a global power guarantee continual challenges and incentivize competitors to oppose the United States in ways designed to nullify our military advantage. The U.S. already possesses the right mix of tools to prevail in the gray zone, but it must think, organize and act differently.

Gray zone challenges are not new. Monikers such as irregular warfare, low-intensity conflict, asymmetric warfare, military operations other than war and small wars were employed to describe this phenomenon in the past. President John F. Kennedy was speaking about the gray zone during his 1962 address to the U.S. Army Military Academy's graduating class when he said:

*"This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him."*<sup>1</sup>

Massive investments in technology and unrivaled expertise in combined arms warfare give the U.S. a conventional military dominance not seen since the Roman Empire. However, this only holds



**FIGURE 1** The last 100 years of American military involvement. The U.S. military active duty end strength is shown in brown, ranging from a couple hundred thousand in the early 1900s and peaking at 11 million during World War II, and gradually declining to its current strength of about 1.4 million. Above the strength graph are five conflicts during the past century fitting the traditional war model: World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam and Desert Storm. They feature large, force-on-force engagements by uniformed militaries fielded by nation states. Below the strength graph are 57 instances when the U.S. military conducted foreign operations.

true for the model of state-on-state conflicts dominated by traditional militaries fighting one another for battlefield supremacy. History shows this depiction of war is accurate only by exception.


Figure 1 depicts the last 100 years of American military involvement. The U.S. military active duty end strength is shown in brown, ranging from a couple hundred thousand in the early 1900s and peaking at 11 million during World War II, and gradually declining to its current strength of about 1.4 million. Above the strength graph are five conflicts during the past century fitting the traditional war model: World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam and Desert Storm. They feature large, force-on-force engagements by uniformed militaries fielded by nation states. Below the strength graph are 57 instances when the U.S. military conducted foreign operations.<sup>2</sup> The exact number can vary depending upon the criteria used to define a foreign military operation, but taken as a whole, they offer a good representation of gray zone challenges — missions falling short of a declared war, yet important enough to send American service members into harm's way. Traditional war might be the dominant paradigm of warfare, but gray zone challenges are the norm.

The last time the U.S. declared war was more than seven decades ago, when President Roosevelt signed Joint Resolutions formally declaring war on Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania on June 5th, 1942.<sup>3</sup> For every declared war, the U.S. military has deployed or engaged in

combat scores of additional times. For example, more than 40,000 U.S. troops took part in the 14-month invasion and occupation of the Dominican Republic to prevent it from “going Communist” in 1965-66.<sup>4</sup> This intervention merits little more than a footnote in American military history. The Dominican Republic foray rarely comes to mind in discussions concerning actions by the world's most powerful military, but it is more typical of U.S. military operations than large-scale conventional conflicts. For every traditional war the U.S. military fights, it engages in multiple gray zone operations.

### Gray Zones Characteristics

Some level of *aggression* is a key determinant in shifting a challenge from the white zone of peacetime competition into the gray zone. The U.S. seeks to address disputes through diplomacy, but has always reserved the right to take military action to defend its interests, even acting upon that reservation despite multinational pressure to the contrary. Established laws, policies, authorities and mechanisms arbitrate disagreements in peacetime, and Americans benefit greatly from an ordered world where all parties play by known rules. The post-World War II international system was established by and to the advantage of the United States and the West. A slew of state and non-state actors now aggressively oppose this Western-constructed international order, but in ways that fall short of recognized



**FIGURE 2** Gray zone challenges are perspective-dependent, the U.S., Russia and Ukraine interpret the conflict differently. For the U.S., it falls closer to the white zone. For Russia, it more closely approaches the black zone while Ukraine sees it as rooted deep in the black zone of potential war.

thresholds of traditional war. In simple terms, we understand war and peace, and how to act during these instances, but there is a vast range of conflicts between these well-understood poles where we struggle to respond effectively.

Gray zone challenges are also *perspective-dependent*, as depicted in figure 2. In eastern Ukraine, the U.S., Russia and Ukraine interpret the conflict differently. For the U.S., the contest falls closer to the white zone, and is best handled by economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure. For Russia, it more closely approaches the black zone of war, suggesting that a willingness to act more aggressively is appropriate. Its actions emphasize the information and military lines of national power. Ukraine sees it as an existential threat to the sovereignty of its nation, justifying national mobilization — actions rooted deep in the black zone of potential war. Understanding the differing viewpoints of the parties involved in gray zone challenges is critical; providing insights into each party’s level of commitment and how far each is willing to go in pursuing their objectives.

Finally, gray zone challenges feature *ambiguity* regarding the nature of the conflict, the parties involved or the relevant policy and legal frameworks. By definition, the gray zone is ambiguous, which results from both our own organizing principles and our adversaries’ purposeful actions. We struggle when dealing with challenges not fitting neatly into our traditional models. No organization in the U.S. government has primacy for gray zone challenges, so it is not surprising that our responses lack both unity of effort and unity of command. Our adversaries are often well informed on our gray zone shortcomings, and can act purposefully to maximize ambiguity in a given situation. For example, Russian material and manpower assistance to separatists in the Ukraine is extensively documented, but official Russian government denials inject just enough uncertainty into the situation to blunt Western responses. The exact methods of obfuscation vary by situation, but even in the era of globalized information, adversaries can use ambiguity effectively to avoid accountability for their actions.

## Gray Zones Discussed

The current international order is largely a Westphalian construct, emphasizing human rights, free-market economies, sovereignty of the nation-state, representative government and self-determination. In the past, gray zone challenges typically emanated from state-sponsored groups or nation-states adopting strategies seeking to avoid escalation. Now, non-state and proto-state organizations such as al-Qaeda and Daesh can amass resources and connect enough formerly disparate individuals to constitute threats that cannot be ignored.

America’s status as the global leader guarantees it will face multiple, constant gray zone challenges. U.S. national security interests are worldwide, and there is a set of rogue state and non-state actors defining themselves, at least in part, by standing in opposition to America and its values. The U.S. can selectively avoid some, but not all gray zone challenges. For example, the scale of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack demanded a robust U.S. response, while other lesser known terrorist groups’ actions have not risen to the level where it is a significant concern for the U.S. national security apparatus.

Nation-states remain strong cornerstones of the international system, but the myriad challenges facing them are proliferating and strengthening faster than states’ powers. Any international system maintaining a reasonable level of world order must account for numerous powerful non-state actors and multiple sources of legitimacy and governance.

The relative certainty we experienced facing the Soviet Union during the Cold War seems simpler when compared to today’s disorderly global landscape. It is easier to deal with nation-states because they generally follow established rules; rules that were typically to our advantage. There is an elegant simplicity inherent in nation-states. They control their borders, exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and govern their populations. There is a single, centralized entity with which to negotiate, and events can proceed at the pace of diplomacy. During the Cold War, even when nation-states made deliberate choices to engage in gray zone activities, U.S. responses were still governed by the rules of state-to-state relations. That is not the case today. What differs today is the growing number of potential gray zone actors, the tools available to them and the velocity of change. For example, it was far simpler for the State Department spokesperson to respond to the tightly controlled messages from the Soviet-era TASS than to have a ready reply for the thousands of Twitter accounts linked to Daesh and its supporters. The trend towards gray zone conflicts increasingly disadvantages entrenched governmental bureaucracies.

Globalization is also having a tremendous impact on gray zone challenges, and we are only beginning to understand the implications. Specifically, globalization has radically reshaped the way information flows and has put technology and communications tools, once the exclusive purview of nation-states, into the hands of individuals. While it is impossible to know exactly how this megatrend will reshape the world, it offers the potential to drive societal change on the scale of that induced by the Gutenberg printing press. The 15th century invention of movable type led to fundamental changes in language, literacy rates, the way ideas promulgated and the very structure of society<sup>5</sup> — remarkably similar to what we are witnessing today. Just as Europe’s literate elite had to adapt to change, so too must we evolve our current governing structures to account for a rapidly changing environment.

Nations and populations are now interconnected and interdependent in unprecedented ways. Overall, centralized government is becoming more expensive and less effective, while the tools available to non-state actors are trending the opposite way. As America experienced over the last 15 years, the price of major combat operations is escalating to the point of being cost-prohibitive. These trends portend an expanded gray zone, since nations are even more reticent to engage in open warfare, and can now find and exploit other less conventional tools of leverage. For example, European dependence on Russian energy supplies and American concerns about potential uncontrolled escalation tempered the West's response to Russia's *de facto* invasion of eastern Ukraine.

One significant challenge for the U.S. is that decisive actions in the gray zone are far easier to carry out by authoritarian or centralized decision-making structures than by democratic, consensus-building governments and coalitions. Unified control of the levers of power may be an anathema in democracies, but it streamlines the speed of decisions and unity of effort in the gray zone. Gray zone challenges tend to involve multiple instruments of power simultaneously, and

“For the United States, being able to dominate one slice of the spectrum of conflict does not necessarily translate into supremacy across the full range of security challenges. We must think, plan and act differently to succeed in the gray zone.”

unity of command is helpful in achieving rapid and effective results. In contrast to centralized regimes, no single person in democracies can direct all actions in the gray zone. The net effect in democracies is to create intense bureaucratic friction arising from our own organizing principles, resulting in strategic and operational rigidity. At best, we can achieve alignment of the goals and actions among our disparate countries and organizations. At worst, we experience self-induced paralysis and find ourselves constantly reacting late to more nimble autocratic gray zone actors.

In its early history, the U.S. often employed gray zone stratagems when confronting established powers. As the United States rose to become the dominant world power, this dynamic reversed. Our current national security architecture largely derives from the National Security Act of 1947, with its fundamental organizing precept focused on maintaining the world order rather than challenging it. In part because of this strategic commitment to the status quo, the U.S. has not been organized for gray zone challenges since World War II, and has often not responded to them particularly well. In many ways, the United States has a yawning gap in its laws, policies, mental models and approaches used to deal with the gray zone. America's response to gray zone challenges tends to be either overly militarized or overly constrained. Because these challenges typically feature ambiguity in the legal and policy arenas, we cannot neatly bin the challenges as either purely peacetime or exclusively warfare. We have clear concepts and models for using law enforcement and military tools, but we struggle to apply them in the muddled middle ground.

Not every non-state actor in the gray zone deserves significant attention; a useful benchmark for concern is when belligerent ambitions and operational reach become transnational. For example, Basque separatists in Spain and France confine their

goals and actions to a relatively restricted geographic region and aspire to little more than an autonomous Basque state. In contrast, many militia groups in Libya have pledged loyalty to broader, global insurgent movements such as al-Qaeda or Daesh. These groups pose a gray zone challenge worthy of dedicated resources and action, as much for what they could become as for the danger of today. The Latin principle of *obsta principiis* (take care of bad things when they are small) applies.

Most importantly, traditional war and gray zone challenges have fundamentally divergent natures, requiring different lexicons, approaches and executions. While they resemble each other superficially and involve the violent clash of wills, they require fundamentally different approaches. In fact, antagonists typically choose to work in the gray zone precisely because they want to avoid full-scale war and its potential to trigger an overwhelming U.S. military response. There is no universal solution to gray zone challenges, but the logic of belligerents in avoiding large-scale war remains constant. For the United States, being able to dominate one slice of the spectrum of

conflict does not necessarily translate into supremacy across the full range of security challenges. We must think, plan and act differently to succeed in the gray zone.

### Working in Gray Zones – Implications

America spends roughly \$600 billion every year on defense, and it is the dominant global power by every objective measure. Yet state and non-state actors (e.g., Russia and Daesh) are increasingly undeterred from acting in ways inimical to the global common good. State actors like Russia and China reasonably believe we will not use nuclear or conventional military force to thwart their ambitions if they craft their aggressive actions to avoid clear-cut military triggers. Despite their inherent ambiguity, the United States should not be frustrated by gray zone challenges. Rather, we should aim to achieve favorable outcomes by taking some practical steps to improve our ability to address them.

*Whole of Government:* Our responses to gray zone challenges display several clear deficiencies. As separate U.S. government agencies strive to achieve their individual organizational goals, they seldom act in integrated ways to support wider government objectives. The National Security Act of 1947 served us well, but in an era far removed from the Cold War, the United States needs a new construct for the 21st century. There is widespread agreement that going forward, we will require an unprecedented level of interagency coordination capable of synchronizing all elements of national power. Absent a forcing function, government organizations will simply do more of the same. The new national security structure must be responsive, integrated and adaptable. This is a major overhaul of our security infrastructure, it will be difficult, and it will not take place overnight. The time to start is now.

We also need to grow our non-military capabilities. Our gray zone actions are often overly militarized because the Department of Defense has the most capability and resources, and thus is often the default U.S. government answer. Having more institutional capability outside of DoD optimized to operate between the clearly defined lanes of law enforcement and full-scale war will help avoid predictable, binary U.S. responses. Our counter-Daesh campaign is a perfect example. Thousands of airstrikes helped to check their rapid expansion, but the decisive effort against them will require discrediting their narrative and connecting the people to legitimate governing structures — areas where DoD should not have primacy.

*Root Causes:* Prudent strategies recognize root causes and address them. Daesh, for example, is merely symptomatic of the much larger problems of massive populations of disaffected Sunnis estranged from legitimate governance and a breakdown in the social order across much of Africa and the Middle East, which will worsen in coming years by economic and demographic trends. Daesh is also a prime example of gray zone challenges, since the legal and policy framework of how to attack a proto-state is highly ambiguous. Coalition aircraft started bombing Daesh in August of 2014, although the authorization for use of military force is still under debate a year later, highlighting the confusion on how to proceed. Notably, devising a realistic strategy requires a holistic understanding of the challenge and the environment. Many gray zone “threats” are really symptoms rather than the actual “problem.” As in the medical field, we should manage symptoms and cure the disease. The key is to first identify the core issue, design a strategy to focus actions and ensure our tactical and operational activities are properly aligned. Tactical brilliance (a U.S. military strong suit) is meaningless or even counterproductive absent an over arching strategy.

*Comprehensive Deterrence:* Detering emerging security challenges is far better than responding to them once a crisis erupts. Great effort went into developing deterrence theory during the Cold War, but this field languished once the Soviet Union dissolved. Deterrence in this era focused on nuclear warfare, but it suggested valuable concepts of counter-force, counter-value and countervailing targeting with potential for broader applicability, each of which is applicable to U.S. strategy in gray zone conflict. In brief, counter-value targeting aims to destroy the society, counter-force targeting aims to destroy an enemy’s military capabilities and countervailing targeting aims to deny victory by eliminating what a particular entity values. Paradoxically, each deliberate gray zone challenge represents both a success and failure of deterrence — success in averting full-scale war, but a deterrent failure given the belligerent’s decision to take action in the gray zone.

A useful analogy is how firefighters fight fire. They do not attack the flame itself. Rather, they understand the fire triangle of fuel, heat and oxygen and tailor their actions accordingly. Similarly, we can apply fire triangle models in approaching gray zone challenges. Daesh is burning white hot now, but it represents only the flame. Even if all its adherents vanished tomorrow, the conditions would still exist to spawn a successor movement. Daesh must be dealt with, but only as part of a wider, systemic effort to address the underlying conditions allowing it to flourish.

State and non-state actors alike value identifiable people, places and things. Holding these at risk and demonstrating the will to leverage these vulnerabilities can contribute to comprehensive deterrence. Creating a credible threat of unconventional warfare aimed at countervailing targets is one possibility. For example, China is both antagonistically asserting its questionable claims to specific islands

and atolls in the South China Sea while simultaneously expanding its import of raw materials from Africa. Instead of confronting China in the South China Sea directly, surrogates could, theoretically, be used to hold China’s African interests at risk in order to compel a more favorable outcome of South China Sea disputes. Thus, the point of action (e.g., Africa) might be far removed from the point of effect (e.g., Asia), but the intent would be to alter the decision-making calculus regardless of geography. To be credible, such an approach requires prep work every bit as important as the infrastructure behind our nuclear and conventional capabilities. Capable and trustworthy surrogates are the result of years of purposeful relationship nurturing, and the vast majority of the work should take place pre-crisis.

*Opportunities:* A new lexicon would help us to better understand and engage challenges in the gray zone. Gray zone actors purposefully seek to avoid conventional war, yet we inevitably use military terminology and planning processes to shape our response, even when there are better alternatives. Changing our terminology could also help us pursue opportunities and not just build a massive (but potentially irrelevant) defense architecture prepared for high-end armed conflict. The U.S. has the most powerful and best-equipped military in the history of the world, which is designed to prevail in traditional wars against peer competitors with large conventional militaries. This high-end tool is often not the appropriate one to use as a main effort in the gray zone, yet too often we default to the military and its accordant vocabulary of “seizing the initiative, winning and centers of gravity,” even when these are irrelevant to the particular issue at hand.

Changing our vocabulary could help yield better decisions in the gray zone. Adopting a business vocabulary and a “SWOT” model (strength, weakness, opportunity and threat) would open other opportunities not available in military decision-making models. Similar to the way businesses decide how to allocate capital, we would necessarily distinguish between opportunities and threats and have at least an estimate of our expected return on investment. Talking and thinking differently about national security in the gray zone would help us measure the oft-ignored opportunity costs and come up with some metric, however imperfect initially, to measure our expected return on investment for defense dollars.

Cost should be a significant up front consideration. For example, we famously refused to provide a cost estimate for Operation Iraqi Freedom, other than to know that \$200 billion was far too high. Assuming we established \$200 billion as the top end to “invest” in Iraq, it would at least force us to review our actions and evaluate our return on investment as we blew through initial estimates on our way to spending in excess of \$2 trillion.<sup>6</sup> Just the exercise of estimating costs and examining our actions when we reach those estimates would help frame future debates about potential interventions and their attendant opportunity costs.

*Specialization:* Being good at one type of conflict, say force-on-force conventional war, does not necessarily mean we are good at another type, say counterinsurgency. It would be nice if governing high-end warfare meant we were dominant across the entire gray zone, but that is not the case. War and the gray zone share some characteristics, but the fundamentally different approaches required to do both well necessitate specialization. As many senior strategists have suggested, there should be two broad categories of U.S. military forces. Category One forces should focus on conventional warfare and be powerful enough to defeat potential adversary state militaries such as North Korea. Category Two forces would focus on being





**TRAINING GRAY** Special Forces Soldiers work alongside Mongolian partners to conduct advanced rifle marksmanship in preparation for a joint exercise. U.S. Army photo was taken by Sgt. Keith Gill.

able to act in the gray zone. They would feature smaller, more agile and deployable units. The two sets of forces would not necessarily be mutually exclusive, and they could support each other as needed. However, their manning, training and equipping would look quite different. The two forces would have different skill sets, orientations and day-to-day missions. As the U.S. demonstrated the ability to operate efficiently and effectively in the gray zone, it would lessen the need to do so over time. Gray zone challenges to the U.S. are increasing rapidly in the hyper-connected world of the 21st century, and having a force structure reflecting this reality is a strategic imperative.

## Conclusion—Gray Can be Good

The ambiguity making gray zones so vexing also makes them useful to statesmen. In fact, they are crucial to the conduct of international relations in defining the importance of situations to the parties involved. That is, states and non-states can ‘test the waters’ with gray zone activities to determine the relative strength of domestic and international commitment to an endeavor without resorting to the more lethal violence of war. In brief, gray zone conflicts are an immensely better alternative to full-scale wars.

Since the end of the Cold War and subsequent triumph during Desert Storm, the United States has demonstrated it has no peer competitor in the conventional military domain. Not surprisingly, America’s adversaries thus purposefully seek to avoid playing to her strengths. Precious few state and non-state actors are foolish enough to line up uniformed troops and subject them to the full wrath of American military might.

We cannot ignore gray zone challenges altogether. On the contrary, we should seek to identify, understand, and highlight activities running counter to U.S. interests. This awareness can help attribute

nefarious activity, potentially increasing costs for that activity even if the U.S. does directly intervene. This understanding could also enable early application of U.S. instruments of power, ultimately operating in the gray zone to our benefit by shaping the arc of change closer to its origins. The United States already has most of the tools required to secure and advance its national security interests in the gray zone. However, it must evolve its organizational, intellectual and institutional models to flourish in the middle ground between war and peace and avoid the predictability and rigidity characterizing its actions since the end of the Cold War. **SW**

*Capt. Philip Kapusta is a U.S. Naval officer currently assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command J5.*

## Notes

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# SOFCCC

## Special Operations Forces Captain's Career Course

BY CAPTAIN SHAWN STANGLE

In 2012, the Senior Leaders of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School sought to strengthen the characteristics that define the Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological Operations regiments through the development of the Special Operations Captain's Career Course. Due to the demand, the three regiments developed a course that trains and educates special operations forces captains in a more unified manner, taught by special operators for special operators. SWCS not only gained operational benefits but assisted the Army in overcoming fiscal constraints as well. In October 2012, Headquarters Department of the Army instructed SWCS to conduct the Special Operations Captain's Career Course pilot. To date, nearly 1000 ARSOF future leaders have graduated from SOFCCC. SOFCCC is tirelessly working to support the ARSOF Next vision of "creating an ARSOF identity that is universally accepted by its formations and recognized by those it serves."

### What is a Center of Excellence?


The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command defines a Center of Excellence as "a designated command or organization within an assigned area of expertise that executes one or more TRADOC core functions; develops and integrates capabilities across the Army warfighting functions; performs the force modernization responsibilities of the proponent." The U.S. Army has eight designated CoEs that oversee 32 Army schools. Each CoE focuses on an expertise aligned with an Army Warfighting Function. Prior to the addition of the seventh WfF of Engagement, the special operations community aligned with Movement and Maneuver. Although Special Forces officers attended the Maneuver Center of Excellence, the ARSOF regiments attended any available CoE. Without all ARSOF officers receiving a unified education, a disparity in planning and maneuver doctrine developed. This disparity in skills was created due to the diverse backgrounds of recruited officers and the education received from various CoEs. Today, the Engagement WfF enables SWCS as the SOCoE to develop education programs for special operations junior officers that provides a shared purpose, understanding, ideas and teachings. An increased force capability now exists because of the commonality in education.

On the first day of the SOFCCC, the integration of the SOF imperatives and the lifetime commitment to the mission of the ARSOF regiments begins, as does the relationships between members assessed into all three regiments. This cementing of relationships allows for continued collaboration throughout their careers. SOF-

CCC develops ARSOF officers who are prepared to integrate within any operational environment using critical and creative thinking skills via the "SOF mindset." Simply stated, the SOF mindset is one distinctively created to thrive in ambiguous situations and the ability to produce extraordinary results. The focus of the education in SOFCCC works to develop the human as the platform and create an understanding that education is a force capability. Students also leave with an understanding of how to utilize Army planning processes to assist in the improvement of military force capabilities in Army operations. Graduates possess a refined institutional knowledge of maneuver operations and a greater understanding of the SOF lifelong learning model.

Members of the special operations community designed SOFCCC based on an approved Common Core curriculum from the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Prior to arriving to the course, special operations candidates complete coursework to establish baseline understanding via distance learning. SOFCCC consists of a 12-week course that involves six weeks for Army Common Core curriculum and six weeks for maneuver curriculum. Members of the special operations community serve as SOFCCC instructors to provide students with critical insight on the integration of SOF capabilities across the Army's Range of Military Operations. All SOFCCC instructors utilize the Army Learning Model to engage adult learners more effectively, capitalize on experiential learning and develop knowledge retention skills.

Nine core blocks of instruction comprise the Army Common Core focused on topics ranging from leadership to cross cultural skills and Army Training Management. The majority of the ACC is student-led and instructor-facilitated learning. The majority of the topics and blocks of instruction are introduced via the "Flip Model" where students are assigned homework to prepare for the next day's discussion. Utilizing the Flip Model in conjunction with the Army Learning Model increases knowledge retention and student classroom participation. With increased classroom participation, there is a better explicit knowledge transfer between students through shared experiences. ACC requires students to review tactical-based doctrine and classes to begin preparation for company and battalion science via guided self-development. Guided self-development provides the officers with a base of knowledge of maneuver doctrine which is further developed during company- and battalion-level planning exercises.



The maneuver curriculum consists of six weeks of instruction, which is completed at the company level utilizing the Troop Leading Procedures and at the battalion level utilizing the Military Decision Making Process. The company phase begins with one instructor-led planning exercise to educate students on the steps of TLPs, provide planning techniques and prepare students for isolation planning. Isolation planning consists of five company-level operations over the course of eight days. Upon the completion of each OPORD, students conduct terrain walks with their small group instructors to highlight the impacts of terrain on maneuver, allow students to individually analyze each operations order and develop heuristics to assist future planning. The company phase provides students with adequate planning skills to transfer to battalion-level planning.

The battalion phase consists of two battalion planning exercises and one final 96-hour dynamic staff exercise. Each operations order utilizes the same base scenario and builds in complexity for the planning exercise. The final exercise incorporates 24-hour continuous planning, staff estimates and a solid understanding of MDMP as a planning tool, not a product producing process. During the process students are assigned senior leader mentors acting as group and brigade commanders. Assigning mentors provides students critical feedback in addition to their SGIs throughout the process. The culmination of the final planning process is a Combined Arms Rehearsal provided by the students to senior leaders of the Army Special Operation community. Additional training executed during the final exercise has consisted of simulated media interviews with student planning teams and the introduction of host-nation role players by students to analyze the completed

plan from an alternate perspective. The exercise provides experiential learning to junior officers on how to brief senior leaders, which is common within the ARSOF regiments. When SOFCCC students complete the battalion phase, they are prepared to complete their assessed branch qualification course.

### **SOFCCC Resource Preservation and Continued Contributions to SOF**

SOFCCC is not only an advantage in uniquely preparing assessed students for their branch qualification course but is a fiscally responsible solution to creating a unified identity. During sequestration, the special operations community analyzed the stress of multiple PCS moves in the requirement to attend a Captain's Career Course and complete a respective qualification course. With the creation of SOFCCC, the Army eliminated the burden of one PCS move on the assessed officer and family and saves approximately \$7 million per year or \$20,000 per Soldier in PCS costs. Reducing Captain's Career Course backlog for other CoEs has also been a benefit. Moreover, the ARSOF operational force has gained approximately 7 to 14 months of operational utilization, allowing officers more key developmental opportunities.

ARSOF must utilize the SOCoE more effectively to shape our ARSOF Promise to the Nation through the continued training and educational investment of our force. SOFCCC truly embodies the ARSOF Next "Promise to the Nation" through our stewardship in exemplifying the "ARSOF shared values, beliefs, vision and commitment." **SW**

*Capt. Shawn Stangle is a Psychological Operations officer assigned as the commander of Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne).*

## ANNOUNCEMENTS

### 2nd Quarter Board Schedule

DATE	BOARD
26 JAN 16	Reserve Component Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Selection Board
03 FEB 16	FY17 Colonel OPS Command/Key Billet
23 FEB 16	Colonel Army Promotion Selection Board
01 MAR 16	AC-USAR (AGR) Master Sergeant Promotion/Sergeant First Class QSP
07 MAR 16	Reserve Component Major APL Promotion Selection Board and Captain APL SELCON

## SPECIAL FORCES BRANCH

### From the Special Forces Branch Chief, LTC Mike McLendon

I want to take this opportunity to pass on some valuable information and to provide an update on where we stand as a Branch. We will continue to use MilSuite and our website as the primary means to disseminate information, but we will also introduce a quarterly newsletter that will be e-mailed to the Enterprise email accounts of all SF officers. I encourage all officers to stay engaged with the SF Branch and to contact us if there are any questions or concerns about the state of the Regiment or Army.

#### Key Points:

- As the Army continues to restructure the force, the SF Branch will experience lower than the historic average branch promotion rates across nearly all pay grades. Additionally, Special Forces will participate in selective early retirement boards for lieutenant colonels and colonels as well as officer separation boards for select year groups.
- OERs continue to be the primary contributor for promotion and CSL selection. Senior raters must ensure that their message is clear to the board members.
- HRC continues to balance competing operational requirements with the need to meet Army Manning Guidance for units outside of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Emerging requirements must be scrutinized to avoid creating 18A/180A gaps within the rest of the Army.

#### MilSuite Access

Please ensure that you and your subordinates possess a MilSuite account. MilSuite is the primary method of transmitting information to the field. Below are links to the Special Forces Branch Assignment Officers' MilSuite pages.

- **LTC MilSuite:** <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-branch-lieutenant-colonels>
- **MAJ MilSuite:** <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-major-assignment-officer>
- **CPT MilSuite:** <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-captains-board>
- **WO MilSuite:** <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/us-army-special-forces-warrant-officers>

### SF Branch Webpage

<https://www.hrc.army.mil/Officer/Special%20Forces%20Officer%20Home>

### FY15 Lieutenant Colonel Promotion Board Results

Congratulations to the officers selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel this year. SF Branch experienced the highest promotion rate within Operations Division, promoting at 74 percent in the primary zone when all SF officers within Department of Defense are considered. There was also a 17 percent promotion rate above the zone and a 1 percent promotion rate below the zone. Performance in key and developmental assignments appeared to be the greatest discriminator for the second consecutive year.

### FY16 Lieutenant Colonel Assignments

Assignments for 1st and 2nd quarter are finalized and all RFOs are either released or in staffing. If officers experience any difficulties with their orders or report dates, please contact the lieutenant colonel assignment officer as soon as the problem is identified.

Assignment preferences are still being accepted for officers scheduled to PCS next summer (April-September 2016); detailed information is located on MilSuite. SF Branch anticipates having more SF lieutenant colonel requirements than available officers, so HRC will place considerable scrutiny on non-18A assignments. We anticipate finalizing the assignments for next summer prior to Thanksgiving.

### FY16 Major Assignments

The 1st and 2nd quarter FY16 assignments are almost complete. If an officer is scheduled to move between September of 2015 and March of 2016 and has not been notified of a complete or pending RFO, please contact the SF major assignment officer as soon as possible.

Assignment preferences are still being accepted for officers scheduled to PCS next summer (April-September 2016); detailed information is located on MilSuite. If an officer has not submitted assignment preferences to the assignment officer, please do so soon. HRC anticipates finalizing the assignments for next summer prior to Thanksgiving.

## WARRANT OFFICER

### Warrant Officer Slating

The Special Forces Warrant Officer slating board convened at the Warrant Officer Institute, Fort Bragg, N.C. October 14-16. The USASOC senior and command chief warrant officers discussed and validated the training and development assignments as well as broadening assignments for the summer 16-02 distribution cycle (April- September 2016).

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, which educates and trains warrant officer candidates and Special Forces warrant officers at key points in their careers and provides the force with highly capable combat leaders and innovative planners, will be reorganizing the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course from three classes of 30 students a year to two classes of 30 students a year starting in FY17.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course educates and prepares mid-grade Special Forces warrant officers to serve as leaders, planners and advisers at the Special Forces company and battalion levels as well as select Table of Distribution and Allowance positions throughout the special operations forces community. The SF CW2 should complete the SF WOAC prior to promotion to CW3. SF CW2s are eligible to attend the SFWOAC after serving for one year. Contact your battalion warrant officer to plan the best dates to attend. Complete a DA Form 4187 and submit to CW4 Jeff Pauch, the 180A assignment manager, at [Jeffrey.a.puach.mil@mail.mil](mailto:Jeffrey.a.puach.mil@mail.mil) to enroll. An example of the DA Form 4187 is located on the Special Forces Warrant Officer MILSUITE page, under SF WO PME (<https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/us-army-special-forces-warrant-officers>). Promotion trends show that the most competitive warrant officers are those who have completed their Professional Military Education on time or early. If you have any questions, please contact the SF Warrant Officer Institute at (910) 396-0117 or the 180A Proponent Manager at (910) 432-7597.

## LANGUAGE

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command ARSOF 2022 Priorities refer to “core tasks and skills that are common to all special warfare missions — language, cultural competencies, etc.” and further specifies in Priority 1. Invest in Human Capital, 1A. Enhanced Education and Training, Desired Effects: “Success in the future operating environment places a premium on the mastery of problem solving and highly specialized technical skills; for special warfare units this includes foreign language and cultural expertise.”

As USASOC moves forward in pursuing the tenets of ARSOF 2022, the following current references regarding control language proficiency standards are offered as a quick reference for the force:

- “To successfully complete Phase 5, Soldiers must achieve a minimum of 1/1 listening and speaking as measured by the two-skill oral proficiency Interview.” (SFQC Phase V, Language and Culture, page 34, FY2015 Academic Handbook, USAJFKSWCS).
- Foreign language proficiency “... is an essential skill and is critical for all SF officers.” (Chapter 16 Special Forces Branch, DA Pam 600-3, Officer Professional Management).
- “...Active Duty Soldiers are required to continue their foreign language qualification and cultural skills at the proficiency rating of 1/1 or higher.” (Chapter 8 CMF 18, DA Pam 600-25, Non-Commissioned Officer Personnel Management).
- “The command standard is 1/1 for all CMF 18 and 2/2 for all officers, warrant officers, ODA team sergeants and 18F NCOs.” (Section 5-6. Language Training, page 26, USASFC (A) REG 350-1, dtd 22 February 2010).
- “All language trained personnel are required to test annually.” (Section 5-6. Language Training, page 27, USASFC (A) REG 350-1, dated 22 February 2010).

## RETIREMENT

### 2012-2018 Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA)

TERA authorizes members with more than 15, but less than 20 years of total active duty service to apply for early retirement. The opportunity to retire under the TERA program is expected to end by Dec. 31, 2018.

TERA is not an entitlement and eligible members who desire early retirement must apply for consideration, as approval is not assured.

To apply for TERA, members must have an involuntary separation date from active duty of Sept. 20, 2018 or earlier, must have twice failed selection for promotion to the next grade and have 15 but less than 20 years of active service as of their established involuntary separation date.

For more information on TERA, see MILPER message 12-329 (<https://www.hrc.army.mil/milper/12-329>).

## GET PUBLISHED IN SPECIAL WARFARE

The Special Warfare staff needs your help to make this the best professional development magazine it can be. Drop us a line and let us know your ideas and opinions. Better yet, send us your articles and photos for publication.

Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author’s chain of command. Photos should be reviewed and approved

for release by your Public Affairs Office. See page three for additional details.

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or

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For additional information call:

910-432-5703



## ADEQUATE ENERGY AVAILABILITY: WHAT IS IT? & WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

BY CHRISTI M. LOGAN, MS, RD, CSSD, LDN

Diet affects health and performance, and the foods that you choose will affect how well you physically train and/or perform on missions. A Soldier's energy needs are made up of several components: baseline metabolic needs, growth and physical activity. When energy is used in one of these processes it is not available for the others, so the diet must provide sufficient energy to support all of the essential functions. When daily energy intake (EI) is equal to energy expenditure (EE), the Soldier is said to be in energy balance (EB) (i.e.  $EB = EI - EE$ ). Soldiers will change their energy balance by altering energy intake, energy expenditure or both components in order to reduce body fat (energy deficit), produce muscle mass gains and/or support growth (energy surplus). However, an important concept is that of energy availability (EA). This is defined as the energy that is available to the body to manage the body's physiological needs after the energy cost of physical activity has been deducted from daily energy intake (i.e.  $EA = EI - \text{Energy cost of physical training/missions}$ ). The body can manage small drops in energy availability, but if the drop is too great, this will compromise optimum health and essential function processes including reduced basal metabolic rate, compromised immunity, poor hormonal function and impaired bone density, as well as menstrual disturbances in female Soldiers. The threshold below which the consequences are particularly harmful is usually discussed in terms of a Soldier's Fat Free Mass (FFM) (i.e.  $\text{Body mass} - \text{Body fat}$ ). This threshold is set at 30 kcal per kilogram (kg) FFM. (See Table for examples of adequate and low EA.)

Three situations typically associated with low energy availability are restricted eating for weight control or loss of body fat, inadvertent failure to increase energy intake sufficiently during periods of high volume training or missions, disordered eat-

ing and eating disorders. Female Soldiers are especially at risk for low energy availability due to these issues coupled with the additional dietary needs and challenges they face as females, as compared to their male counterparts. Though disordered eating was often thought as the main cause of energy deficiencies, we now know many Soldiers (male or female) can get into situations of low energy availability without the backdrop of disordered eating or eating disorders. Weight loss undertaken too fast without any problem behavior or undue stress, Soldiers who have extremely strenuous physical training programs and/or missions, or Soldiers with sudden increases in total training load are all situations where energy intake make not keep pace with energy needs resulting in low energy availability. Finally, due to training demands or mission requirements the practicality of consuming the required high energy intake day after day can be challenging leaving many Soldiers, some unaware that they are falling behind in meeting their energy needs or that it is problematic. See the section below for ideas on how to optimize and/or avoid low energy availability.

### Optimizing Energy Availability

Tips to promote healthy energy availability and/or avoid low energy availability:

- Be sure to increase food intake on heavy physical training days and mission days.
- Eat all meals and snacks on your meal plan. Using your appetite as a trigger to consume food may not allow you to meet your daily energy needs. Ensure >30 kcals per kg FFM daily, though you may need to eat 30-45 kcals per kg FFM daily.
- Be sure to eat more foods during periods of muscle gains and intentional body mass gains. Aim for >45 kcals per kg FFM daily.

Examples of Different Levels of Energy Availability		
Energy Availability = Energy Intake - Energy Cost of Training/Competition		
Situation	Energy Availability Goal: Calories per Kilogram (kg) Fat Free Mass (FFM)	Example
High Energy Availability for Growth or Body Mass Gain	> 45 kcals	Soldier A: 65 kg and 20% body fat FFM = 80% x 65 kg = 52 kg fat free mass (FFM) Daily training = 800 kcal Daily energy intake = 3520 kcal Energy availability = (3520-800)/52 = 52 kcal/kg FFM
Adequate energy availability for weight maintenance	45 Kcals	Soldier B: 65 kg and 15% body fat FFM = 85% x 65 kg = 55 kg fat free mass (FFM) Daily training = 800 kcal Daily energy intake = 3285 kcal Energy availability = (3285-800)/55 = 45 kcal/kg FFM
Reduced energy availability but still adequate for healthy weight loss (or weight maintenance at reduced metabolic rate)	30-45 kcals	Soldier C: 55 kg and 20% body fat FFM = 80% x 55 kg = 44 kg fat free mass (FFM) Daily training = 800 kcal Daily energy intake = 2340 kcal Energy availability = (2340-800)/44 = 35 kcal/kg FFM
Low energy availability = negative health implications	< 30 kcals	Soldier D: 55 kg and 25% body fat FFM = 75% x 55 kg = 41 kg fat free mass Daily training = 800 kcal Daily energy intake = 1980 kcal Energy availability = (1980-800)/41 = 29 kcal/kg FFM

- Prepare for variances in your food environment (i.e. travel or changes in living situations). Prepare meals and snacks in advance or, when moving, set-up the kitchen first to get back on track with fueling patterns.
- Avoid drastic diets that limit food intake or variety. Severe energy restriction may result in both low EA and unwanted health and performance consequences.
- If you are developing stress related to food and body image, seek expert help right away.

### Are You Training With Low Energy Availability?

Signs you may be experiencing with low energy availability:

- Joint pain or bone pain in your lower body (may also be felt at rest).
- Menstrual disturbances (female Soldiers).
- Poor hormonal functions (male or female Soldiers).
- Low bone density (i.e. Stress fractures and/or inadequate bone formation for age).
- Elevated urinary ketones (fruity smelling urine).
- Reduced basal metabolic rate (feeling tired throughout the day and during training).
- Frequent colds or illnesses (i.e. compromised immune system).

### Ways to Improve Energy Intake

- Plan for and consume frequent meals and snacks during the day.
- Keep a food log to identify gaps in intake and plan to increase fueling during those times.
- Always carry snacks on busy days.
  - Sports bars or chews
  - Pretzels, crackers, dried fruit, cheese sticks, bagels, nuts
  - Sports drinks or 100 percent juices
- Drink your calories using fruit smoothies, liquid meal supplements and fortified milkshakes.
- Eat while you train: Consume carbohydrates before, during and after training.
  - Before and during: sports gels, bars, chews, fig newtons, toast or sports drinks.
  - After: chocolate milk, protein shake and bar, sandwich or protein bar and sports drink. **SW**



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## Information Strategy & Political Warfare (698) Curriculum at NPS

— Generating Enhanced Capabilities To Support ARSOF 2022 —

It is well known within ARSOF that the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School has been providing quality graduate education for officers, warrant officers and NCOs for more than two decades. What is not well known is that two academic programs exist to help meet USASOC's educational needs to support ARSOF 2022. The older program is the Special Operations/Irregular Warfare (699) curriculum. However, the Defense Analysis Department also offers students a degree in Information Strategy and Political Warfare (698). It is important to note that both degrees reside within the DA Department and core courses, which make up approximately half of a student's total course load, are the same for both curricula.

The 698 curriculum is designed for both information professionals, future J3s and joint force commanders. Its purpose is to: Educate military personnel to better defend the nation and prevent, prepare for and prevail in conflicts by operating effectively in the information environment. This curriculum is about engaging a wide range of audiences to inform, persuade and influence targets to act in a manner advantageous to U.S. interests. It also concedes that the credible capacity to coerce remains a key instrument of statecraft.

ARSOF 2022 calls for selected special operators to be “the strategic nexus for all DoD influence activities” that include:

- “Mastery of the cyber domain...”
- “Education in military deception...”
- “Develop procedures for use of social media and other tools of influence...”
- “High end communications to influence...”
- “Reinvigorate cultural intelligence including experts in persuasion, traditional communications and the use of social media and other cyber-based tools...”

The connection between ARSOF priorities and the 698 curriculum is clear.

698 Program Core	699 Program Core
Organizational Design	Organizational Design
Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare or Int. Terrorism	Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare
Modeling for Military Decision-making, I & II	Modeling for Military Decision-making, I & II
Deterrence, Compellence & Crisis Management	Deterrence, Compellence & Crisis Management
Warfare in the Information Age	Warfare in the Information Age
Models of Conflict (Modeling III)	Models of Conflict (Modeling III)
Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-making	Critical Thinking and Ethical Decision-making
Culture and Influence	Anthropology of Conflict or Culture and Influence

698 Specific Curriculum	Additional Elective Options for CA
Public Diplomacy, Political and Psychological Warfare & the Media	War & Its Impact on Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Wicked Problems or Visual Analytics	Ethnicity & Ethnic Conflict in the Developing World
Conflict in Cyberspace	Nationalism & Revolution
Electronic Warfare	The Politics of Global Economic Relations
Jihadist Information Operations	Comparative Economic Systems
Deception, Denial, Surprise Attacks and Counterdeception	Regional Studies Courses
Computer Network, Attack, Defense and Exploitation	Negotiation & Consensus Building
Intelligence in the Information Age	
Trust, Influence and Networks	
IO Planning	
Militaries and Technological Change	

**FIGURE 1** The courses in red are core courses common to both the 698 and 699 curricula.

The 698 curriculum best supports the education needs of PSYOP and CA officers, NCOs and DoD civilians and better diversifies the USASOC knowledge portfolio. More importantly, it enhances ARSOF capabilities.

Figure 1 compares the 699 and 698 curriculum. The courses in red are common to both the 698 and 699 program core. The 698 program has specific curriculum not available in the 699 curriculum and additional elective options are available for CA personnel to better support ARSOF mission requirements. Key, and what is not evident on the chart, is the flexibility within the 698 curriculum to customize course sequences based on student interests and follow-on assignments needs. A wide variety of elective options

exist at NPS drawing on other academic programs to include: cyber, electronic warfare, computer science, information science, intelligence, business and regional studies. Additionally, students complete JPME I through the on-campus Naval War College program and receive a Joint Information Operations Planning Course certificate concurrent with 698 program requirements.

The Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg is in the process of updating all relevant documents to reflect the importance of the Information Strategy & Political Warfare (698) Curriculum for enhancing USASOC's overall capabilities through better educated soldiers. **SW**



# MADE TO STICK:

## WHY SOME IDEAS SURVIVE AND OTHERS DIE

The staggering complexity of the problems Special Operations leaders are tasked to solve and advancements in technology have led to an exponential increase in the amount of information provided to senior leaders. With “flat communications,” SOF leaders at the operational and strategic levels are subjected to an almost unending bombardment of briefings, teleconferences and written reports that they are required to process and action.

While this unfettered flow of information is necessary to promote a common understanding of the operating environment, it dictates that tactical-level leaders must adapt to provide information in such a way that it doesn’t get buried in a clogged email inbox and that senior leaders are able to understand, remember, and act on it— in short, tactical-level leaders need to make their information ‘stick’ in the minds of senior leaders.


In their book *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive & Others Die*, authors Dan & Chip Heath provide detailed advice on how to do just that — to take an idea or concept and make it “sticky,” easier to remember. The authors draw upon a large body of psychology & sociology research and personal experience as experts in the field in an attempt to detect patterns in past ideas that ultimately proved successful, with an aim of replicating these best practices to promote worthy ideas. While primarily focused on commercial marketing and public awareness-raising campaigns, their findings have relevance for tactical-level SOF personnel seeking to effectively communicate information to senior leaders.

The authors break down communication into a five-step process, stating that ideas must be advocated in such a way that the audience 1) pays attention, 2) understands and remembers the key Concepts, 3) agrees and believes with the concepts, 4) cares and 5) is able to act on the information. While hardly ground breaking, what makes this book relevant is the authors’ practical advice on how to maximize the effectiveness

of communication. In the course of the work, they identify six main themes that distinguish successful ideas from the less-successful, claiming that ‘sticky’ ideas are communicated in such a way that is simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional and involves compelling storytelling. They support their hypothesis with scientific studies and a large number of examples, written in an accessible and absorbing manner.

Some of these themes will be familiar to military writers, who are already encouraged to put the “bottom line up front” and to strip down ideas to their core concepts. However, other concepts will be less familiar and well-worth the investment of time to understand. The Curse of Knowledge is one such concept, which the authors claim is a mind-state wherein we find it difficult to remember what it was like before we knew a particular piece of information and which impacts our ability to communicate the concept to others. This curse afflicts many military writers, who find it conceptually hard to imagine what it is like not to understand the conditions they encounter daily at the tactical-level. The authors provide best practices on how to place items of information in context to maximize their effectiveness, illustrating how to best use statistics and how to form associations between the information a person is seeking to communicate and something that the audience already cares about.

This approach to analyzing and improving how ideas are communicated can also inform the way tactical-level SOF leaders interact and articulate concepts within their own formations as well as to external host-nation and interagency partners. For example, overcoming the Curse of Knowledge is necessary to explain in plain language how Information Support Soldiers “inform & influence” populations or Civil Affairs Soldiers address “civil vulnerabilities” within the civil component of the battlespace — missions that have specific doctrinal meanings that will likely not be fully understood



Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die...

**MADE**  
to  
**STICK**  
Chip Heath & Dan Heath

### DETAILS

**By Chip Heath & Dan Heath**

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outside of the military sphere. Applying the authors approach to communicating ideas will assist SOF leaders to establish a common understanding of the strategic environment, both inside and outside their formations.

The concepts presented in *Made to Stick* are valuable tools for tactical-level leaders needing to clearly articulate information of importance to their leadership. While not specifically focused on military communication, the best practices collected by the authors are relevant and will help ensure that information being provided to our SOF commanders and policy makers is presented and conveyed in an effective manner. As technology continues to improve and the volume of information available to commanders increases, this will become increasingly important to organizations needing to ensure that critical information is not lost or overlooked. **SW**

# AN OPPOSING VIEW OF MILITARY SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN FRANCIS

The United States military should not be actively engaged in post-war reconstruction beyond security-related tasks. Additionally, the military should never assume the lead in post-war reconstruction. The military continually *does*; however, find itself in this difficult position by virtue of the fact it is usually the only U.S. government entity engaged on the ground in everything preceding post-war reconstruction. Put another way, military forces are usually on the ground before anybody else with the expertise to conduct post-war reconstruction is in place.

Military operations are phased in order to coordinate different entities toward a goal. Per Joint Doctrine JP 3.0 *Joint Operations*, “a phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.”<sup>1</sup> There are six phases, 0 “Shape”, I “Deter”, II “Seize Initiative”, III “Dominate”, IV “Stabilize” and V “Enable Civil Authority.”<sup>2</sup> Post-war reconstruction spans the last two phases of operational execution. The military has historically excelled at the four phases 0-III — that precede the two post-war reconstruction phases. When the military has struggled with the final two phases, the post-war reconstruction ones — domestic political will wanes quickly. Post-war reconstruction often goes by a different term, nation-building. According to the definition provided by James Dobbins, former ambassador and RAND consultant, nation-building “involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.”<sup>3</sup>

There are three reasons why the military should not be actively engaged in post-war reconstruction beyond security — related tasks. First, the military has no mandate, second the military has not done post-war reconstruction well, it has a spotty record at best, and third, the fiscal realities in this country have imposed a much smaller force across the Department of Defense.

DODI 3000.05 *Stability Operations* (September 16, 2009) instructs the DoD

US Government Stability Sectors	Lead US Agency
Security	Department of Defense
Justice and Reconciliation	Department of Justice
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-being	United States Agency for International Development
Governance and Participation	United States Department of State
Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure	United States Department of Commerce United States Department of Agriculture

FIGURE 1 Government stability sectors.

to have the capability and capacity to “lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.”<sup>4</sup> This instruction acknowledges that stability operations are tasks and activities the military conducts in coordination with other instruments of national power, typically diplomatic, informational and economic. The military’s role is primarily security or civil engineering related, and should not venture into the more complicated post-war reconstruction, or nation-building tasks, best left to other governmental entities. This DoD instruction supports a precise role for U.S. military forces, and these do not support societal post-conflict reconstruction or nation-building.

The U.S. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 *Stability* identifies five core U.S. government stabilization sectors necessary for stabilization. The agencies best suited to lead and manage the five government stability sectors are listed in figure 1.

Even given DoD Instruction and Army doctrine, there is little appetite or enthusiasm to *do* these security tasks. Post-war reconstruction is simply not in the cultural DNA of the military. As far back as September 1865, less than six months after the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Gen. William Sherman, the hero of the March to the Sea and through the Carolinas, wrote his brother John, a U.S. Senator from Ohio, “No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thought of

people South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation. All we can, or should attempt, is to give them rope, to develop in an honest way if possible, preserving in reserve enough military power to check any excesses if they attempt any.”<sup>5</sup> Perhaps Gen. Sherman foresaw the War Department’s oversight of the Freedman’s Bureau as a recipe for disaster. If there is ever any question as to a wider role for the military in post-war reconstruction or nation-building consider the post-war reconstruction of the American South. The Federal Army, the implementers of the post-war reconstruction shared the same ethnicity, the same religion, the same language and the same political history as the vanquished, yet still the post-war reconstruction was considered a failure during and after the troops withdrew 12 years later in 1877. It strains credulity to expect American-led efforts to succeed in other parts of the globe — especially if led by the military — when it failed in our own country.<sup>6</sup>

Less than 50 years after Sherman wrote those words, the military found itself again conducting post-war reconstruction in the Philippines. The United States fights generally two types of war, those of choice and those of necessity. Broadly speaking, wars of choice, also known as wars of aggression, are characterized as expeditionary in nature, not as a response to an imminent threat, and not necessary as a last resort. Wars of necessity on the other hand are deemed as those that threaten our existence, or those threatening vital national interests. Examples of wars of necessity have been the American Civil War, World War II and the Afghanistan Campaign. Domestic American political

will defines the warranty or shelf life on both types of conflict. Generally Americans want wars of choice to be short, quick and decisive like Desert Storm. Americans are more patient when the military is engaged in existential wars of necessity like the Civil War or World War II. The majority of conflicts and wars that the military has participated in have been irregular or low-intensity conflicts of choice. Just because the military dominated on the battlefield, the opponent seldom acquiesced. See the Indian Wars, or the Philippine Insurrection following the short and quick Spanish American War, or to the insurgency in Iraq following President George W. Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech of May 2003. When an insurgency sets in after emphatic battlefield victories Americans lose patience. The high domestic support that always precedes these conflicts wanes quickly as U.S. forces get mired attempting to "stabilize" the environment in the middle of an insurgency. Unless there is detailed planning and coordination across governmental organizations to answer the question "What do we replace it with?" The military finds itself in an unpopular war.

The third reason the military should not engage in post-war reconstruction is a practical one. The 2003 Iraq war of choice was supposed to pay for itself off of the proceeds of Iraqi oil. The cost of the war eventually exceeded \$3 trillion, and we still have Soldiers fighting there. The fiscal realities of paying for that war at the same time as the one in Afghanistan, along with the 2008 financial crisis and government sequestration, contributed to a perfect financial storm and steepened the drawdown already planned in the military. Simply put, the military lacks the bandwidth to plan, train or equip for anything but quick and necessary wars.

None of this means that we will not be involved in post-war situations in the aftermath of active combat operations at some point again. Instead of post-conflict reconstruction, the military should focus on expanding the elements of a safe and secure space for other governmental organizations to operate and for them to do the work of post-conflict reconstruction. There is a good prescription proposed by the non-partisan, Congressionally established and federally funded United States Institute for Peace in coordination with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. USIP produced a document

in 2009, the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.<sup>7</sup> This document identifies security as the first priority for U.S. Government stability sectors. This document groups five elements together in a strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction, safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy and social well-being. The Department of Defense, USIP and the Army all recognize that the military should not be the lead in post-war reconstruction beyond security-related tasks. Using the USIP Strategic framework as an example, the military can focus on these tasks of which they are inherently best suited:

- Safe and Secure Environment
  - Cessation of large-scale violence
  - Public Order
  - Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence
  - Physical Security
  - Territorial Security

First, cessation of large-scale and widespread violence is self-explanatory. The shooting between combatants must stop. Second, public order means creating a safe physical space for citizens to conduct their daily affairs. This means safety to conduct business and trade, open schools and to shop. Third, legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence is a 'Weberian' concept related to the definition of a state. According to Max Weber, 1919 German theorist, a state retains the monopoly on violence. In other words, insurgent groups like a *Fedayeen* or other armed groups have no legitimacy. Fourth, the military is best suited to establish physical security by establishing a constabulary or expeditionary police force. The purpose is to safeguard key political elites, the local face to post-war reconstruction. Fifth, in addition to a monopoly on violence, a state requires a defined territorial boundary with its neighbors and for internal purposes. This seems obvious but to groups like Daesh it was not random that one of the first things they did was bulldoze the border between Iraq and Syria. Military forces are best suited to maintain territorial integrity.

It is almost a given that threats emanating from parts of the world described as 'fragile' or 'weakened' will continue to demand resources and attention from the rest of the world. The United States almost certainly will be involved militarily if not unilaterally with partners. If there

is not adequate combined planning with the entities responsible for the stabilization lines of effort, the actual political outcome will be in jeopardy. To plan on the outcome after the shooting begins is too late. As stated above, the military's primary stabilization focus should remain only within the security domain. These security-related tasks fall within the realm of DoD Instruction, U.S. Army doctrine and the USIP strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction.

The United States military should not be actively engaged in post-war reconstruction beyond security-related tasks. It should not participate in institution building or anything considered nation-building. These endeavors are always long and costly. They seldom achieve our aims entering a conflict, and they sour domestic American support. Military force will never transform people no matter how much governments wish or will it to happen. Instead, the military should focus its efforts post-war exclusively within the security stability sector. **SW**

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